Economic Inequality, Political Support, and Protest

An Examination of the Impact of Economic Inequality on Protest Voting, Political Support, and Participation

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
Summary

This policy report investigates the relationship between economic inequality and the levels of political support and participation in European democracies. The main question is how variations in economic inequality, both between countries and over time within countries, shape citizens' support for traditional political institutions and their engagement in political activities. Specifically, it investigates whether higher levels of inequality lead to diminished political support and participation. The report further asks if these effects differ for citizens with different socio-economic positions. In other words, do levels of political support and participation vary more between different socio-economic groups in countries with high or low economic inequality?

To answer these questions, quantitative analyses were conducted utilising data from the World Inequality Dataset, World Governance Indicators, World Bank, OECD, and the European Social Survey. The study includes 27 European countries over the period 2002 to 2022.

The findings from the first part of the analyses reveal that rising inequality erodes citizens' political support for democratic institutions. Moreover, as inequality grows, citizens disengage from using institutional forms of participation, shifting toward non-institutional and civic participation, and even protest voting. Additionally, it is particularly citizens in worse-off socio-economic standings – in terms of income, education, and occupation – that exhibit lower levels of political support and participation, while mainly expressing dissatisfaction via protest voting.

The second part of the analyses focuses on disparities in political support and participation across socio-economic groups in countries with respectively enduringly low and high economic inequality. The results indicate that, in countries marked by high economic inequality, disparities in political support and participation associated with income and occupational differences are larger than in economically more equal countries. Yet, disparities linked to educational differences are larger in economically more equal countries.

The findings of this report highlight the importance of economic equality in shaping equitable political support and encouraging political participation. Economic inequality fosters greater dissatisfaction with democratic political institutions amongst all citizens and widens the political gap between well- and worse-off citizens.

(Introduction

Economic inequality poses a serious challenge to democracy. It deepens divisions in political trust and creates barriers to equal participation in politics (Gallego, 2015; Gillissen et al., 2024; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Van de Walle & Migchelbrink, 2022; Van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017). As the gap between the rich and poor widens, the equal playing field for citizens to express their voice and have their demands be met by policymakers – foundational to democratic governance – starts to favour the economically privileged. When more citizens lose trust in politics because of this unequal access to political power, and those with fewer economic resources stop participating, democracy becomes increasingly fragile and less stable.

In the face of high and growing inequality, it is necessary to investigate if European citizens believe that their governments listen to them and work to improve society. In this light, the **INVOLVE project (funded by Horizon Europe, 2023-2026) explores how improving public services can help to include vulnerable citizens in the face of inequality.**[1] To this end, INVOLVE focuses on identifying which citizens are most likely to disengage from politics when confronted with economic inequality. Doing so helps to develop policies that strengthen democracy and include the voices of all citizens. This report precisely investigates these questions, focusing on how economic inequality affects political engagement and support among citizens of different socio-economic standings, focusing on income, education, and occupational status. Specifically, it examines how inequality shapes political participation, trust in democratic institutions, and protest voting in European democracies for citizens with a given socio-economic standing. It shows how economic inequality has diverging political consequences depending on citizens' social status and income position.

The focus on political participation, political support and protest voting as indicators of the state of democracy is in line with the Eastonian framework (Easton, 1965, 1975; Norris, 1999, 2011, 2022), that puts forward *political support* **and the expression of** *political demands* **as key factors of political stability**. Political support is captured by citizens' trust in political institutions and by their satisfaction with democracy (Easton, 1965, 1975). The expression of political demands can be done by engaging in political participation, that comes in three forms: institutional, non-institutional and civic participation (Marien et al., 2010; Theocharis & Van Deth, 2018; Van Deth, 2014). In addition, more recently, citizens have begun to express their lack of political support by voting for a political party that represents drastic changes from the traditional political order (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Sipma et al., 2023).

The question then is how disparities between citizens in political support and participation are impacted by economic inequality. Economic inequality operates on several levels, each of which can have an influence on how citizens express their political demands and how they support their democratic system. Concretely, inequality implies an imbalance, which can be between (i) different countries over a long period of time, (ii) different time points for the same country, and (iii) citizens with a different socio-economic standing within a given country.

In Europe, differences in economic performance and political culture that originated from the 20th century, continue to exist between Western European countries and Eastern or Southern European countries. What is more, since the 2000s, countries have had varying degrees of success and failure in reducing their own level of economic inequality, particularly following the economic recession of the late 2000s (Chancel et al., 2022; Neef & Sodano, 2022). These dynamics reflect on the one hand *enduring differences between countries* and on the other *transient fluctuations within countries.* Beyond those macro-level dynamics, individual citizens differ in their income position and social status. Such differences give way to disparities in political support and participation between more and less well-off citizens (Bartels, 2008; Elsässer & Schäfer, 2023). While inequality worsens living conditions for most citizens and has a negative impact on their access to political power (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010), it benefits privileged groups who have the resources to influence politics in their favour (Bartels, 2008). While these forms of inequality (enduring disparities between countries, growing disparities within countries, and disparities among socio-economic groups of citizens) have been

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[1] https://involve-democracy.eu/

shown to negatively affect political support and participation, less is known about how country-level dynamics of economic inequality matter for individual citizens.

This report explores two competing mechanisms to gain insight into how inequality matters for citizens depending on their socio-economic standing. On the one hand, inequality can fuel resentment among citizens in lower social status and income positions. This makes them more likely to support radical political movements that promise sweeping reforms. This dynamic arises when socio-economic grievances become so severe that traditional political systems lose their credibility (Arzheimer, 2009; Gidron & Mijs, 2019), leading to reduced political trust and greater support for political protest parties. In short, **greater economic inequality may amplify political disparities between individuals.** On the other hand, those who find themselves in a worse-off socio-economic standing may experience a growing need to understand and justify their position within their unequal society (Jost & Van der Toorn, 2012), inhibiting a decline in support for traditional political parties. Moreover, they may see the risks of sweeping political change as too high, leading them to refrain from supporting radical political parties, or political participation altogether (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). In short, **greater economic inequality may reduce political disparities between individuals.**

Research has yet to fully explore how country-level inequality contributes to disparities in political support and participation among citizens, as studies have primarily focused on cross-country differences at a single point in time, within-country changes over time, or individual-level inequalities separately. This report addresses that gap by distinguishing between inequalities that reflect *long-term differences between countries* and those that reflect *short-term changes within countries*. To take into consideration potential differences in these effects between citizens, the relationship between these forms of inequality, measured by a country's income and wealth distribution, and various indicators of political support and participation is estimated for citizens depending on their socio-economic standing in terms of income, education, and occupation.

In that regard, this report is guided by the following research questions, as further outlined in the project's grant agreement:

I.   How does economic inequality, both within and between countries, shape citizens' political support, as defined by citizens' 1) political trust, and 2) satisfaction with democracy?

II. How does economic inequality, both within and between countries, shape citizens' political participation, including 1) institutionalised activities, like voting, 2) non-institutionalised activities, such as protests, 3) civic engagement, and 4) protest voting?

III. How are differences in political support and participation between well- and worse-off citizens, in terms of their socio-economic standing, influenced by differences in economic inequality between countries?

The remainder of this report is structured in the following manner. Section 1 reviews what is already known about how economic inequality influences political support and participation, focusing on the varying impacts it has on citizens of different socio-economic standings and its potential *dampening* and *deepening* effects. Section 2 gives information on the data used for the analyses and how the report measures economic inequality at the contextual level and citizens' social status and income position at the individual level. Section 3 examines how economic inequality between and within countries and individual socio-economic standing are associated with disparities in political support and participation. Section 4 summarises the findings and provides recommendations for policymakers.

1. The Relations between Economic Inequality, Political Support and Participation, and Socio-Economic Standing

1.1 Political Consequences of Economic Inequality

Economic inequality, defined as asymmetries in the amount of financial or monetary resources possessed by individuals within a given context (Atkinson, 1970)**, has been persistent across Europe**. Since the 1980s, there has been greater wealth concentration in the top 10% richest Europeans away from the middle 40% and bottom 50% of citizens. More than half of all net wealth is now in the hands of the 10% richest individuals today (Chancel et al., 2022). This economic gap between rich citizens, the middle class and poorer citizens, also affects political dynamics (Gillissen et al., 2024).

Economic inequality impacts political support and participation by creating structural imbalances in access to politics that undermine ideals of democratic equality. As economic resources become concentrated in the hands of a few, these elites gain disproportionate influence over political institutions and public decision-making processes. Consequently, public agendas are limited in scope to the interest of these elites, often at the expense of broader equitable public policies (Bartels, 2008; Filetti & Janmaat, 2018; Schakel & Hakhverdian, 2018; Solt, 2010). This creates a feedback loop in which economic power translates into political power, reducing the accountability of political systems to the wider population and increasing responsiveness to the demands of a few (Uslaner, 2008, 2017). Indeed, research shows that countries with a higher level of economic inequality have lower levels of political support (Andersen, 2012; Goubin, 2020; Krieckhaus et al., 2014), as well as lower rates of electoral political participation (Schäfer & Schwander, 2019; Solt, 2008, 2010).

Next to facilitating political inequalities, **economic inequality also erodes social cohesion.** Inequality fosters mistrust between citizens of different socio-economic groups (Goubin, 2018; Wilkinson, 2020). As economic disparities grow, people of different income groups increasingly live and work in separate spheres, reducing opportunities for cross-class interactions. This segregation limits mutual understanding and cooperative collective decision-making. Shared community spaces, crucial for fostering democratic engagement, are hence diminished, weakening the social fabric (Qi et al., 2024). In line with this, empirical research shows that greater economic inequality is related to multiple 'social dysfunctions', ranging from poorer community well-being, more people with severe health problems, to higher crime rates (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010).

When large parts of the population feel socio-economically marginalised and politically excluded, the legitimacy of democratic institutions is called into question, risking political instability as people lose trust in their political systems. This can result in declining support for incumbent actors, reduced participation in institutionalised democratic processes, and a growing success of protest parties that promise radical alternatives. These trends create avenues for citizens to express grievances outside the mainstream system but often at the expense of weakening overall political stability (Arzheimer, 2009; Gillissen et al., 2024; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017). **In all, greater economic inequality at the national level is likely to deteriorate political support and use of conventional forms of participation.**

Box 1. Defining Democratic Inputs: Political Support and Political Demands

Following the Eastonian framework (Easton, 1965, 1975; Norris, 1999, 2011, 2022), two democratic inputs are key to maintain political stability: **political support and political demands.** For democracies to flourish, citizens must perceive governing institutions as legitimate and acting on their behalf (Norris, 1999, 2011, 2022). In essence, **democracies need broad political support**. Yet, for governing institutions to act on behalf of their citizens, citizens must also articulate their political demands, which can be achieved via activities that signal to political institutions what citizens' policy priorities are (see also Schlozman et al., 1995). Hence, next to broad political support, **democracies need citizens to express their political demands**.

Political Support

Political support is indicative of the **confidence that citizens have in their political institutions to uphold a certain quality of (democratic) governance without needing continuous oversight** (Easton, 1965, 1975). It implies an expectation that political systems will autonomously deliver positive outcomes for society. Two indicators are commonly used to capture political support: political trust and satisfaction with democracy.

Political trust reflects **a belief in the benevolence and competence of political actors and institutions** (Norris, 2017). This perception may derive from factors such as perceived responsiveness, concern for specific societal groups, or the quality of policy outcomes (Fiske, 2002; Kumlin & Haugsgjerd, 2017). Overall, higher political trust indicates that citizens believe that political agents will capably act to serve the public interest (OECD, 2017).

Satisfaction with democracy reflects **citizens' satisfaction with the democratic procedures of their country, and their perceptions of their democratic regime's norms and values** (Canache et al., 2001; Linde & Ekman, 2003). The specific norms or procedures evaluated can vary across individuals and may include aspects such as democratic representation, institutional fairness, or executive efficiency.

The primary difference between political trust and satisfaction with democracy is the degree of diffusion, where **political trust** is more **oriented towards specific,** contemporary **actors and institutions**, **while satisfaction with democracy** is more **oriented towards abstractions of the political system as a whole** (Easton, 1965, 1975).

Political Demands

A functioning democracy also requires citizens to express their political demands, which brings us to political participation: **activities through which citizens aim to influence political decision-making**. What distinguishes these activities from other behaviour is that they are oriented towards *'affecting politics'* (Van Deth, 2014, 353), which has three key criteria: (1) the activity has to be an 'act' or 'intervention' by citizens, (2) that is targeted towards political agents, such as politicians or the government, and (3) is done voluntarily. Within this understanding of political participation, three major types of activities can be differentiated based on their relationship to established political institutions (Marien et al., 2010; Theocharis & Van Deth, 2018; Van Deth, 2014).

Institutional participation refers to **activities accepted and recognised by the political system.** Such activities include voting in elections, contacting public officials, displaying political campaign merchandise like campaigning signs or badges, donating to political organizations, or being a member of a political party. This often leads these forms of participation to be compliant or supportive of the current political system.

Non-institutional participation refers to **activities that occur outside traditional political structures**, which often make them regarded as less legitimate by political institutions. These activities are typically more disruptive or confrontational and less directed at specific political agents. Such activities include demonstrations, signing petitions, boycotting products, and sharing political content online.

A related form of participation is **civic participation**, referring to **activities oriented towards improving the community directly** as opposed to influencing political institutions (Theocharis & Van Deth, 2018; Van Deth, 2014). Such activities seek to take a more direct, hands-on approach to improve society, without relying on the actions of political actors. A key example is volunteering in social organisations such as NGOs or churches.

While voting is the main form of participation, citizens can also express political dissatisfaction by the choice of a party. Crucially, should citizens lose feelings of political support, they can express this by voting for political 'protest' parties that **campaign on 'radical' changes to the political status quo**. This includes voting for populist (radical democratic change), radical right (radical cultural change), and radical left (radical economic change) political parties. While these parties can attract support due to ideological appeals (e.g., authoritarianism, nativism, communism), their campaign platform is frequently presented as opposing the political status quo while seeking to mobilize socio-economic grievances (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Sipma et al., 2023).

1.2 Political Disparities by Socio-Economic Standing

In all democracies, disparities in political support and political participation between more and less socio-economically well-off citizens persist (Bartels, 2008; Elsässer & Schäfer, 2023). Citizens need to have the time, money, and civic skills to be democratically involved (Brady et al., 1995). Unsurprisingly, socio-economically less well-off citizens - in terms of income position, educational attainments, and occupational status - face more challenges in engaging with democratic processes.

As one's socio-economic standing worsens, individuals increasingly prioritise meeting immediate basic needs, which leaves less time and energy to consider political aspirations or analyse policy information. In contrast, affluent citizens retain the resources, free time, and social connections needed to engage actively in politics. This facilitates a **gap in the expression of political demands between different socio-economic groups** (Elkjær & Klitgaard, 2024; Gilens, 2012; Rosset et al., 2013). Empirical research indeed shows that citizens with a higher education (Marien et al., 2010), income (Solt, 2008), and occupational status (Heath, 2018), are more likely to express their political voice compared to less well-off citizens.

Such asymmetries in political participation lead policymakers to become more attentive to the desires of the privileged (Lesschaeve, 2017; Schakel & Hakhverdian, 2018), while other citizens do not participate as *'nobody [cared to] ask'* (Brady et al., 1995, 271). When citizens perceive their voice to have less weight in their democracy, they can rationally conclude that expressing their political demands is futile and withdraw their support for the political system (Gallego, 2015; Solt, 2008, 2010). As democratic institutions become more responsive to the needs of some citizens than to others, less well-off citizens stop believing that political institutions produce outcomes beneficial for them and become dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy (Foster & Frieden, 2017; Goubin & Hooghe, 2020). Such sentiments likely feed into a decline in trust toward political institutions (Goubin, 2018). Empirical research indeed confirms a **gap in political support between socio-economic groups** in terms of income (Goubin & Hooghe, 2020), education (Mayne & Hakhverdian, 2017), and social status (Foster & Frieden, 2017).

In short, individual socio-economic differences facilitate disparities in political support and participation.

1.3 Interplay of Economic Inequality and Political Disparities Between Socio-Economic Groups

While it is clear that countries with higher economic inequality have lower rates of political support and participation (section 1.1), and that socio-economically less well-off citizens - in terms of income, education, and social status - are less supportive of politics and are also less engaged in it (section 1.2), **it is unclear as to how economic inequality has an impact on political disparities in support and participation between socio-economic groups**. Two mechanisms can help understand this interplay: **relative deprivation and system justification**.

On the one hand, relative deprivation theory argues that inequality deepens cleavages in political participation and support across socio-economic groups. Relative deprivation results from groups being given 'unequal award', creating cleavages based on a sense of status threat and anxiety (Carella & Ford, 2020; Runciman, 1966). As economic inequality leads to a concentration of political power in the hands of the rich, this increases the importance of cleavages between socio-economic groups. Comparisons to other groups or oneself at a different point in time may lead one to feel relatively deprived, fuelling feelings of status threat and anxiety. This can turn into anger and resentment, which in turn can become directed at the political system (McKay et al., 2021; Smith et al., 2012). Therefore, citizens that experience relative deprivation are more likely to be dissatisfied with their democratic institutions and stop engaging with institutionalised means of expressing political demands. Rather, they turn to non-institutionalised and protesting ways of participating (Power et al., 2020), which further increases the intention to rebel against the system that they lost trust in

(Chen et al., 2018). This creates a sharper divide in who participates in institutionalised ways, favouring those who still trust these institutions and have the resources to engage effectively (Armingeon & Schädel, 2015; Hooghe & Marien, 2013). From this perspective, **economic inequality amplifies political disparities between socio-economic groups**.[2]

On the other hand, system justification theory argues that inequality dampens cleavages in political participation and support across socio-economic groups. System justification theory highlights that citizens want to believe that the social system in which they live is fair and legitimate, even when confronted with economic inequality (Etzioni, 1988; Jost & Van der Toorn, 2012). For those who are socio-economically disadvantaged, this creates a tension between their experience of inequality and their need to perceive the system as just. Research shows that this dissonance can actually lead to less moral outrage about inequality and lower support for social change (Wakslak et al., 2007). In consequence, people tend to justify the current system, even if it is unfair, which can reduce their anger about injustices, and their sense that taking action would be effective (Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2012). For instance, studies show that in more unequal countries, support for meritocracy is higher (Mijs, 2021), while meritocratic beliefs downplay the severity of inequality and increase its acceptance (Willis et al., 2022). Thus, in more unequal countries, socio-economically disadvantaged individuals are more likely to adjust their fairness beliefs to match their marginalised position. In contrast, well-off citizens experience less dissonance between their socio-economic standing and desires to believe in a just society, freeing them up to be more morally concerned and questioning of the legitimacy of their system (Jost et al., 2003). In consequence, rather than increasing political disparities, **higher economic inequality might reduce differences in political participation and support between socio-economic groups**, as system justification mechanisms take hold.

Few studies have explored how individual political differences, based on socio-economic standing, interact with a country's level of economic inequality, and evidence supporting both the deepening and dampening mechanism has been uncovered. For example, Goubin and Hooghe (2020) found that in countries with long-term high income inequality, differences in political trust related to income, class, and education were smaller, supporting the dampening of political disparities perspective. Similarly Andersen (2012) observed a dampening effect in satisfaction with democracy. These patterns also show up in voting behaviour, where the impact of socio-economic standing on support for radical political parties decreases as economic conditions worsen (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018).

However, not all studies agree. Some find that greater economic inequality deepens the effect of socio-economic standing. For instance, Filetti and Janmaat (2018) showed that income inequality leads to lower participation among poorer citizens in non-institutional political activities, widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Moreover, in a series of studies, Solt finds that greater income inequality does not have a significant effect on voter turnout rates among the richest citizens, while other citizens are less likely to go cast their vote (Solt, 2008, 2010). As such, income inequality amplifies turnout disparities. Finally, Polacko (2022) documents larger turnout gaps between the rich and poor in more unequal contexts, especially when overall turnout is low.

In summary, **existing works provide mixed evidence as to whether greater inequality at the country level deepens or dampens political disparities along socio-economic cleavages. Still, research in this area is limited.** Few studies replicate findings across different measures of political support and participation, and it remains possible that some political disparities are not captured. Moreover, many studies do not differentiate between long-term and short-term inequality (but see Goubin & Hooghe, 2020). This is precisely what this report seeks to further uncover.

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[2] Relative power theory applies a similar logic: it posits that wealth enables greater political influence, giving richer individuals more political efficacy than poorer ones. As economic inequality grows, this disparity widens, exacerbating the gap in political support, participation, and influence between socio-economic groups (Goodin & Dryzek, 1980).

2. Data and Methods

This report examines how political disparities based on socio-economic standing—measured in terms of income, education, and occupation—are influenced by dynamics of country-level economic inequality. All individual-level data comes from the European Social Survey, a bi-annual survey that collects information on attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours of over 285,000 respondents across 27 European countries between 2002 and 2022.[3] This survey provides rich, high-quality data for understanding social and political dynamics. To complement this, the individual-level data is coupled with macro-level data from sources such as the World Inequality Dataset, the World Bank's World Governance Indicators, and the OECD. In this section, the variables, and the methods to conduct this research are discussed. The analyses employ multilevel regression models with random intercepts for countries, using linear models for political support indicators and logistic models for political participation indicators. These models were estimated in R with the lme4 package. **Appendix A** offers a detailed overview of the variables, their availability, and their interpretation.

2.1. National Economic Inequality

To measure economic inequality, this report focuses on the **wealth inequality Gini coefficient.** The Gini coefficient is based on the distribution of resources within a population, providing a summarising measure of wealth disparities. The indicator captures net household wealth, which is the sum of financial assets (e.g., stocks, funds, and savings) and non-financial assets (e.g., land and vehicle property) owned by households, after subtracting debts (e.g., house mortgages, student loans, and credit card debt). The reason to focus on wealth instead of income, is that previous research has shown that the wealthiest individuals earn a larger part of their income from financial investments, while most people rely only on wages from work, with investment returns growing faster than wages (Piketty, 2014). Using wealth rather than income hence provides a more comprehensive measure of systemic economic inequality. In **Appendix C**, analyses using the Gini coefficient of disposable household incomes are reported as robustness test. Data for wealth and income inequality are obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (World Inequality Lab, 2024).

To isolate the effect of economic inequality, two other factors are accounted for at the national level: economic performance and the quality of governance. For economic performance, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is used. The **GDP per capita** represents the total monetary value of all goods and services produced within a country, indicating the health and size of economic activity, averaged over the size of the population. Economic performance generally relates to an enhanced capacity of citizens to engage in political processes (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Teorell & Torcal, 2007) and higher political support (Van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017). Moreover, economic inequality and economic prosperity are interrelated, as extreme inequality can reduce overall economic efficiency and limit access to opportunities. However, the relationship is complex, and countries may exhibit high economic growth as a result of greater wealth accumulation amongst the richest citizens (Stiglitz, 2016). Accordingly, a country's economic performance should be accounted for when estimating the impact of wealth inequality on political participation and support. Data for the GDP per Capita is obtained from the OECD (OECD, 2024).

As an indicator of the quality of governance, the World Bank's control of corruption indicator is used. **Control of Corruption** captures the extent to which citizens perceive public power as being exercised for private gain, whether through petty or grand corruption, or 'state capture' by private interests. Higher values on the control of corruption indicator mean lower levels of (perceived) corruption. In more corrupt countries, political institutions prioritise personal or elite interests over the common good. In such contexts, citizens may

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[3] The 27 countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See Figure 1 in appendix A for country-wave data availability.

withdraw political support and disengage from institutions they perceive as unresponsive to their needs (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017). Inequality and corruption often reinforce one another, as concentrated wealth can enable undue influence over decision-making processes, eroding institutional fairness (Gupta et al., 2002; Policardo & Carrera, 2018). Hence, the extent of corruption should be accounted for when estimating the effects of inequality on political support and participation. The data on the Control of Corruption index is obtained from the World Bank (World Bank, 2024).

Studies that examined economic inequality effects are limited in their insights as they mix changes that occur *within countries* over time with enduring differences *between countries*. To overcome this limitation, this report performs within-between transformations to all country-level variables (Bell et al., 2019; Fairbrother, 2014). Concretely, this is achieved by estimating the average value observed over the period 2002 to 2022 for each country, which allows capturing long-term between-country differences, and the country's yearly difference to this average value, capturing short-term within-country changes. By doing so, the **impact of *higher inequality* within a country is estimated separately from *high inequality* between countries.**

Table 1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics for the indicators described above, as an average over all respondents and countries included in the analysis. For wealth inequality, the Gini coefficient can be any value between 0 and 1, where a higher value relates to more inequality within a country. The average Gini coefficient observed across Europe is 0.74, with the lowest observation being 0.62 (Slovakia) and the highest 0.88 (Ireland). A high Gini coefficient relates to contexts where the top 10% wealthiest citizens are in possession of 65% or more of the country's wealth, while a low Gini coefficient relates to contexts where this group possesses 50% or less of all the wealth in a country. Between 2002 and 2022, the extent of wealth inequality within countries has changed between -0.08 and +0.07, with most changes being between +/- 0.02. In extreme cases of wealth inequality increases, this means that countries where the bottom 50% of citizens in terms of wealth did manage to accumulate some financial assets, lost most of it while being burdened with rising debt (e.g., Greece). As wealth inequality variation within a country is less than that for between countries, and between-country scores tap into systemic differences, between-country wealth inequality is used to examine the deepening and dampening effects of inequality on the relation between socio-economic standing and political disparities.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Country Level Predictors

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Wealth Gini, between	289,898	0.74	0.05	0.62	0.88
Wealth Gini, within	289,898	0.00	0.02	-0.08	0.07
GDP per Capita, between	289,898	41.13	11.82	17.50	62.96
GDP per Capita, within	289,898	-0.08	2.95	-7.94	30.93
Control of Corruption, between	289,898	13.92	7.23	-2.07	23.18
Control of Corruption, within	289,898	0.02	1.43	-4.03	4.15

Note: Data is obtained from the World Inequality Dataset, OECD, and World Bank. Between-estimates indicate the average level observed for a country from 2002 until 2022, hence capturing between-country differences over this time. Within-estimates indicate yearly differences to the average, resulting in a mean score of zero at the country-year level, hence capturing within-country differences over time. Gaps at the country-year level do exist as not all countries participated in each wave of the European Social Survey.

2.2. Political Support and Participation

To gain insight into the impact of economic inequality on political support and participation, this report examines political disparities in political trust, satisfaction with democracy, institutional political participation, non-institutional political participation, civic participation, protest voting and radical voting. In doing so, this report can estimate how economic inequality changes disparities in political support and participation in a

comprehensive manner.[4] Data on these individual level political attitudes and participation is obtained from the European Social Survey (ESS ERIC, 2024).

Political support is measured by using two indicators, one measuring trust in political institutions, and one measuring satisfaction with democracy. Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is operationalised as a sum score based on the following questions: "*On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?*" and "*Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job*?", both with response options ranging from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied). Trust in political institutions is operationalised as a sum score based on the following questions "*Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust*. ..." "*...politicians*", "*...political parties*", and "*...[country]'s parliament*". The available average per survey respondent across the trust and satisfaction items, respectively, are extracted and used as the indicators.[5] **Political support scores higher than five indicate support for the political status quo, while lower scores indicate dissatisfaction.**

Political participation is measured using the extensive battery of items in the ESS for various forms of democratic engagement. Specifically, respondents are coded as having engaged with democracy via institutional means (1, yes; 0, no) when they indicated to have participated in at least one of the following: (i) displayed political merchandise, (ii) contacted a public official, (iii) donated money to a political party, (iv) held a political party membership, and/or (v) worked for a political party, during the last 12 months. These forms of participation predominantly occur within traditional, institutionalised channels for expressing political demands. Respondents are coded as having politically participated via non-institutional means (1, yes; 0, no) when they indicated to have done one of the following: (i) boycotted products for political reasons, (ii) protested or demonstrated, (iii) signed a petition, and/or (iv) posted or shared political content online, during the last 12 months. Last, respondents are coded as having engaged in civic participation (1, yes; 0, no) when they indicated to have volunteered for a non-political organization. **All participation variables are coded as binary (1, yes; 0, no), meaning that the average of each form of participation reflects group participation rates (%).**

Voting behaviour is measured in three ways: turnout to national elections, protest voting, and radical voting. **Turnout to elections** is measured with the question "*Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?*". In keeping with the operationalisations of political participation, turnout is binary (1, yes; 0, no) and reflects rates of voter turnout (%). Next to election turnout, voting behaviour is also measured based on voters' choices. For this report, two main indicators of voting behaviour are used: protest voting and radical voting. **Protest voting** includes respondents who cast their vote for one of the following: (i) a populist party, (ii) a radical right party, (iii) a radical left party, or (iv) a blank/null vote, or another political party. In all these cases, the vote is interpreted as an expression of opposition to the established political order. **Radical voting**, by contrast, focuses exclusively on parties categorised as populist and/or far right or far left. These parties challenge the political order in specific ways with predictable ideological demands. Consequently, votes for 'other' political parties—typically small, niche, or short-lived groups that challenge the status quo through alternative approaches—are excluded. This distinction means that radical voting serves as a somewhat more conservative measure of discontent, while protest voting offers a broader perspective.[6] Protest and radical voting are both coded as

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[4] See Gillissen, Goubin, and Ruelens (2024) for a discussion of trends in these indicators across survey projects. This report concluded that, while there is a decline in electoral participation across Europe, there has been no overall decline in political trust nor other forms of participation. Nonetheless, economic inequality does undermine political trust and electoral participation at the aggregate level. However, a limitation of the focus on country-level trends is that it masks disparities between citizens within a country.

[5] Available average refers to the fact that respondents may not have answered all questions related to trust or satisfaction with democracy. The average is taken from the items that the respondents did fill out, i.e., were available.

[6] 'Other party' refers to the answer option in most voting behaviour survey questions. Though voting for 'other' parties does not, per say, indicate radical voting behaviour, voting for small parties outside the mainstream can be considered as protest voting, reflecting a sentiment of 'none of the above' (Alvarez et al., 2018). For this report, we included parties outside mainstream politics that were recently established, often being parties that participated in just one election, such as the Estonian Free Party, or broader yet niche protest movements, such as the Pirate parties.

binary (1, yes; 0, no). The classification of political parties is based on the PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019). An overview of party coding can be found in **Appendix B**.

The reference group '0', consists of those that voted for more 'traditional' political parties, which includes Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, Liberal, Conservative, Green, or special interest parties that do not campaign to radically alter the political status quo. Citizens that did not vote in their national elections are excluded in the analyses on protest or radical voting as voting abstention can itself potentially be seen as a form of protest. Yet, as the intention of these citizens is unknown, potentially not voting due to other reasons such as forgetfulness, they cannot be classified into one of the two categories. Accordingly, turnout to national elections, or conversely, voting abstention, is measured separately from protest voting.

In **Table 2**, descriptive information regarding the indicators for political support and participation can be found. The numbers show that, on average, respondents are more satisfied with democracy (4.94) than that they have trust in political institutions (4.13). This suggests greater discontent with day-to-day politics than the political system at large. Of all non-electoral forms of political participation, non-institutional participation is the most common form (42%), compared to institutional participation (25%) and civic participation (20%). Nonetheless, these forms of participation remain less used by citizens than voting (79%). In terms of voting, 21% of the respondents indicated to have casted a vote that can be regarded as a protest vote, and 16% indicated to have casted a radical vote.[7]

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Level of Political Support and Expression of Political Demands

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Satisfaction with Democracy	289,898	4.94	2.22	0	10
Political Trust	289,898	4.13	2.22	0	10
Institutional Participation	289,898	0.25	0.43	0	1
Non-Institutional Participation	289,898	0.42	0.49	0	1
Civic Participation	289,898	0.20	0.40	0	1
Voted	289,898	0.79	0.41	0	1
Protest Voting	289,898	0.21	0.41	0	1
Radical Voting	289,898	0.16	0.37	0	1

Note: Data is obtained from the European Social Survey Wave 1 until 11. The indicators for political support are continuous with a scale from 0 to 10. The indicators of political participation are all binary (0/1), meaning that mean scores reflect the corresponding percentages of respondents that indicated to have participated in any of the discussed forms. Statistics reflect the average from 2002 to 2022 across countries.

2.3. Individual Socio-Economic Standing

To examine how political disparities relate to individual socio-economic standing, this report investigates differences relating to income, education, and occupation.

Income is measured using the question "*Using this card, if you add up the income from all sources, which letter describes your household's total net income?*" for the first three waves and "*Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources?*" for the other waves. For the latter, 10 decile groups are used, while the former added two extra categories (11th and 12th). These additional categories for the question in the first three waves have been integrated with the 10th decile for the final variable created for this report, following the ESS coding guidelines. The final values are standardised by country, meaning that income differences are expressed in terms of the distribution for a given country. **Objective income is used as a standardised continuous variable, with a value of 0 indicating an average income.**

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[7] Over the years voter turnout has been declining across Europe (Gillissen et al., 2024), while support for protest parties has risen, particularly Populist Far-Right parties (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017).

Education is measured using the generated variable by the ESS reflecting the highest level of education obtained as based on ISCED codes. The values range from 0 to 7 (0 not recognised by ISCED, 1 less than lower secondary, 2 lower secondary, 3 lower tier upper secondary, 4 upper tier upper secondary, 5 advanced vocational sub-degree, 6 lower tertiary education BA level, 7 higher tertiary education MA or higher level). These values were standardised by country, meaning that educational differences are expressed in terms of the distribution for a given country. **Education is used as a standardised continuous variable, with a value of 0 indicating an average educational level.**

Occupation is measured based on a simplification of Oesch's 16 occupational class groupings (Oesch, 2008). This classification differentiates citizens based on whether they are capital accumulators (large employers, self-employed professionals, small business owners with employees, technical experts, or higher-grade managers and administrators), socio-cultural (semi-)professionals (teachers, artists, social workers), skilled service workers (small business owners without employees, technicians, lower-grade managers and administrators, skilled clerks, or skilled service workers), and blue-collar or unskilled service workers (skilled manual workers, low-skilled manual workers, unskilled clerks, lower-skilled service workers). **Occupation is used as a categorical variable, reflecting differences between capital accumulators, socio-cultural professionals, and skilled service workers, relative to blue-collar or unskilled service workers**. Hence, estimates indicate disparities between a given occupational class and the lowest class of blue-collar or unskilled service workers.

In addition to income and class, basic **socio-demographic** information is controlled for by accounting for gender and age group. Gender is coded to reflect patriarchal privilege, where men are the reference category in comparison to all other respondents (woman and non-binary individuals). Age is coded in groups instead of actual age. The groups are 15-29, 30-49, 50-64, and 65+, where 65+ respondents are taken as the reference category. Additionally, basic **political attitudes** are controlled for by accounting for left-right leaning and satisfaction with public services. Satisfaction with public services is measured using the two questions "*Now, using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of education in [country] nowadays?*" and "*Still using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of health services in [country] nowadays?*" with respondents ranging from 0 'extremely bad' to 10 'extremely good'. The average across the two items is calculated and standardised by country, meaning a score of 0 reflects the average satisfaction with the two main public services in a country. Political orientation was measured using the question "*In politics people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?*". Responses to these questions were standardised by country, meaning a value of 0 indicates a citizen has the average political orientation for their country.

Table 3 shows the descriptive information for the estimates described above. The standard deviation for the continuous variables (income, education, left-right leaning, and public service satisfaction) are around 1, as they are standardised. By making the distributions of the variables comparable, the strength of the estimates in the analyses can be compared.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Individual Level Predictors

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Objective Income	289,898	0.05	1.00	-2.19	2.37
Educational Attainment	289,898	0.12	0.99	-2.01	2.40
Occupation*	289,898	2.32	1.05	1.00	4.00
Gender*	289,898	1.51	0.50	1.00	2.00
Age*	289,898	2.38	0.99	1.00	4.00
Left-Right Position	289,898	-0.01	1.00	-2.77	2.91
Public Service Satisfaction	289,898	0.00	0.98	-5.21	2.97

Note: Data is obtained from the European Social Survey Wave 1 until 11. Most variables are made linear and standardised, meaning all scales are made comparable, though Occupation (Capital Accumulators, Socio-Cultural Professional, Skilled Service Workers, and Blue-Collar or Unskilled Service Workers), Gender (Men, and Women as well as non-binary individuals), and Age (<30,30-49,50-64,65+) are maintained as categorical variables.

3. Estimating the Impact of Economic Inequality and Socio-Economic Standing on Disparities in Political Support and Participation

In the following section, the manner in which country-level economic inequality and individual-level socio-economic position contribute to political disparities in terms of political support and participation, is examined. This is done in two parts.

First, the results of multilevel models are presented with the previously described indicators for economic inequality and socio-economic status as independent variables, and the indicators for political support and participation as dependent variables. These models capture the independent effect of micro- and macro-level dynamics in inequality on disparities in political support and participation. Hence, estimates for country-level effects apply across citizens, and individual-level effects apply across contexts.

Second, political disparities arising from individual socio-economic positions are analysed in the context of a country's average level of wealth inequality over the 21st century. Specifically, these analyses offer insight into how political disparities along socio-economic cleavages differ between countries with persistently high levels of wealth inequality (Gini of approximately 0.85) and those with persistently low levels (Gini of approximately 0.65).

Together, these analyses demonstrate how inequalities in political support and participation, stemming from citizens' socio-economic positions, are either *amplified* or *reduced* depending on the extent of wealth inequality in society.

3.1. Broad Impact of National Wealth Inequality and Individual Socio-Economic Position

Figure 1 shows the estimated change in citizens' political support following differences in wealth inequality, economic performance, and control of corruption between and within countries. While the estimated differences do suggest that citizens in countries with enduring high wealth inequality are less politically supportive, the models indicate that these differences are statistically speaking insignificant. On the other hand, when wealth inequality *within* a country has risen, citizens express significantly lower levels of political support, particularly in terms of political trust, and to a lesser extent in terms of satisfaction with democracy.

As for a country's economic prosperity and control of corruption, the estimates indicate that countries with an on average strong economic output over the 21st century show higher levels of political support, but not significantly higher. It is mainly countries that have maintained a high control over corruption that are notably more trusting in politics and satisfied with democracy. When looking at how yearly changes within countries matter, results show that improvements in economic growth and control over corruption significantly boost political support.

Figure 1. Impact of National Wealth Inequality, Economic Performance, and Control of Corruption on Political Support

Country-Level Effects on Political Support

Note: Bars show the estimated change (one a scale ranged 0-10) in political support indicators (shown in legend) by a one-standard deviation increase in the within- and between-country indicators (wealth inequality, economic performance, control of corruption), accounting for individual differences in socio-economic standing (objective income, education, and occupational class), socio-demographic background (gender and age), and political perceptions (satisfaction with public services and left-right self-placement). Lines on the bars show the margin of error for the estimated change, meaning lines crossing 0 suggest an estimate is insignificant (change possibly higher or lower). Multi-level linear modelling techniques were used. Exact effect coefficients and confidence intervals can be found in Appendix C Table 1.

Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

Figure 2 shows the estimated impact of within- and between-country differences in wealth inequality, economic performance, and control of corruption, on political participation. Foremost, there is a marked difference in the effects of enduring wealth inequality between countries compared to changes in the extent of wealth inequality within countries. All estimates for long-term between-country differences in the level of wealth inequality are negative, although only the estimate for non-institutional participation is statistically significant. This implies that, when accounting for a country's economic performance and control of corruption, **citizens in countries with persistently high wealth inequality engage less in forms of non-institutional participation, though not significantly less in other forms of participation.**

In contrast, within-country changes to the level of wealth inequality have a rather diffuse effect on how citizens express their political demands. When wealth inequality within a country rises above the average, both civic and non-institutional forms of participation see a significant increase, while institutional participation significantly decreases. Moreover, when wealth inequality has risen, voter turnout to national elections significantly decreases while support for protest parties increases. Together, this suggests that **citizens express dissatisfaction with growing wealth inequality within their country, turning away from institutional channels of participation and turning to non-institutionalised or protesting forms of participation**.

Figure 2. Impact of National Wealth Inequality, Economic Performance, and Control of Corruption on Rates of Expressing Political Demands

Country-Level Effects On Political Participation

Note: Bars show the estimated change in the rate (% of respondents) at which citizens engage in a given form of political participation (shown in legend) by a one-standard deviation increase in the within- and between-country indicators (wealth inequality, economic performance, control of corruption), accounting for individual differences in socio-economic standing (objective income, education, and occupational class), socio-demographic background (gender and age), and political perceptions (satisfaction with public services and left-right self-placement). Lines on the bars show the margin of error for the estimated change, meaning lines crossing 0 suggest an estimate is insignificant (change possibly higher or lower). Multi-level logistic modelling techniques were used. Effect coefficients and confidence intervals can be found in Appendix C Table 1.
Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

This aligns with the previous findings, where a heightened level of wealth inequality within a country relates to decreased rates of political support. These results show that **as a result of increasing wealth inequality, citizens become growingly dissatisfied with their political institutions, which also shows in how they express their political demands.**

The estimates for wealth inequality account for economic performance and control of corruption. Looking at between-country differences, the estimates suggest that citizens in countries that had a comparatively high level of economic performance during the 21st century are not significantly more engaged in expressing their demands in any manner. The models do suggest that citizens engage more in non-electoral forms of participation (institutional, non-institutional, and civic participation) in countries that have maintained strong control over corruption, while there is no significant effect on voter turnout. Hence, **long-term differences in control over corruption between European countries have more impact on political participation than economic performance.**

Looking at within-country differences, the results suggest that changes in economic performance also have a limited impact on participation, though higher than average economic growth does significantly relate to higher levels of civic participation and lower levels of non-institutional participation. It is rather within-country changes in the control of corruption that are a strong predictor of political participation. The estimates indicate that significantly more citizens express their demands in all manners when a country has increased its control of corruption. Additionally, support for political protest parties is significantly reduced. Hence, **losing control over corruption risks decreasing all rates of political participation and facilitating the rise of radical parties.**

Figure 3 indicates the differences in political support between citizens of different socio-economic standings, accounting for their political perceptions and socio-demographic background. The findings show that citizens with a higher income, education, and occupational class have significantly higher levels of political trust and are more satisfied with democracy. While the impact of both income and education on political trust is comparable in size, the effect of income on satisfaction with democracy is much larger than the effect of education. When examining occupational disparities, capital accumulators, socio-cultural professionals and skilled service workers are all more supportive of politics than blue-collar and unskilled service workers. For skilled service workers, however, their levels of support remain lower than those of higher occupational classes. These results show that **individual differences in socio-economic standing relate to disparities in political support, where a higher socio-economic standing is associated with being more supportive.**

The findings also show socio-demographic differences in political support, and differences resulting from political perceptions. First, while there is a significant gender gap in terms of political trust, with women being more trusting than men when accounting for other factors, there is no difference in the level of satisfaction with democracy. Second, there is a non-linear pattern in political support in terms of age, with citizens aged 30-64 indicating lower political support than citizens aged between 15 and 29 or over 65. Third, the strongest predictor of political support appears to be satisfaction with public services: when more citizens are satisfied with public services, political support in a country is also higher. Last, there is a notable gap in satisfaction with democracy between left- and right-leaning citizens, with right-leaning citizens being significantly more satisfied. To a lesser degree, they also have more trust in political institutions.

Figure 3. Impact of Socio-Economic Position, Political Perceptions, and Socio-Demographic Background on Political Support

Note: Bars show the estimated change (on a scale ranged 0-10) in more specific and diffused political support indicators (shown in legend) by a one-standard deviation increase in continuous predictors (income, education, public service satisfaction, left-right leaning) and the difference between categories relative to the reference group (occupation, gender, age), accounting for a country's averaged and yearly level of wealth inequality, economic performance, and control over corruption. Lines on the bars show the margin of error for the estimated change, meaning lines crossing 0 suggest an estimate is insignificant (change possibly higher or lower). Multi-level linear modelling techniques were used. Exact effect coefficients and confidence intervals can be found in Appendix C Table 1.
Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

Figure 4 presents changes in the rates at which political demands are expressed by citizens of different socio-economic standings (income, education, occupation), accounting for their political perceptions (left-right leaning and public service satisfaction) as well as socio-demographic background (gender and age group).

First, income significantly impacts all forms of political participation. Results show that citizens with a higher income express their political demands at higher rates than lower income groups via all manners, while expressing lower support for protest and radical parties. In short, **money matters, creating disparities in participation along income groups.**

Second, educational attainments also significantly shape the prevalence at which citizens express their political demands. Results indicate that citizens with higher educational attainments have a greater probability of engaging in civic, institutional, non-institutional, and electoral participation. Moreover, they support political protest and radical parties at slightly lower rates. Hence, **educated citizens voice their political demands more, contributing to inequalities in participation.**

Figure 4. Impact of Socio-Economic Position, Political Perceptions, and Socio-Demographic Background on Rates of Expressing Political Demands

Note: Bars show the estimated change in the rate (% of respondents) at which citizens engage in a given form of political participation (shown in legend) by a one-standard deviation increase in continuous predictors (income, education, public service satisfaction, left-right leaning) and difference between categories relative to the reference group (occupation, gender, age), accounting for a country's averaged and yearly level of wealth inequality, economic performance, and control over corruption. Lines on the bars show the margin of error for the estimated change, meaning lines crossing 0 suggest an estimate is insignificant (change possibly higher or lower). Multi-level logistic modelling techniques were used. Exact effect coefficients and confidence intervals can be found in Appendix C Table 1.

Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

To measure the effect of occupation on political disparities, comparisons are made with the lowest occupational class, namely blue-collar and unskilled service workers (e.g., construction workers, janitors, and food service workers). The results show that socio-cultural professionals (e.g., teachers, artists, and social workers) are the most active in expressing political demands across all types of political participation, with capital accumulators being slightly below those levels. Skilled service workers (e.g., technicians, small business owners, and skilled clerks), the class just above blue-collar and unskilled service workers, also participate more in politics but to a lesser extent than socio-cultural professionals and capital accumulators. Blue-collar and unskilled service workers are more likely than the higher occupational classes to support protest and radical parties, most notably compared to capital accumulators **Overall, the comparisons suggest that citizens in higher occupational classes express their political demands more than citizens in lower occupational classes**.

Figure 4 indicates some other important disparities in political participation too. First, there are significant gender differences: men are more likely to express their political demands than women, except when it comes to non-institutional participation, where women participate slightly more. Second, older citizens tend to be less involved in non-institutional participation compared to their younger fellow citizens but are more engaged in civic and electoral participation. In terms of voting behaviour, protest voting is the most common among citizens aged 30 to 49, followed by those 50-64. In contrast, younger voters (aged 18–29) are least likely to support radical political parties, though the oldest voters (aged 65+) are least likely to support protest parties. Third, satisfaction with public services, such as education and healthcare, is associated with lower rates of institutional and non-institutional participation, as well as protest voting. On the other hand, opinions about public services do not significantly affect civic or electoral participation, suggesting these channels are less related to (dis)satisfaction with public services.

Finally, political ideology plays a role in shaping participation. Left-leaning citizens are more likely to engage in civic, institutional, and non-institutional forms of participation, whereas right-leaning citizens are more likely to turn out for national elections. The findings also suggest a subtle difference between radical and protest voting. Right-leaning citizens are more likely to vote for radical parties, while left-leaning citizens are more likely to support protest parties. This may stem from the greater prevalence of radical right parties compared to radical left ones (see Appendix for party coding), which makes dissatisfied left-leaning voters more likely to vote for a protest party that has not been classified as radical.

In conclusion, the findings above show that citizens are less supportive of their democratic institutions when wealth inequality increases in their country. Moreover, when wealth inequality increases, citizens stop using conventional forms of participation, turning to non-institutional and civic participation, or even protest voting. The citizens that have the lowest levels of political support are those in a worse-off socio-economic position in terms of income, education, and occupation. It is also this group that expresses their political demands to the least extent, with their dissatisfaction mainly being expressed via protest voting. **It remains unclear whether political disparities based on individual socio-economic standing are intensified or diminished in contexts of high economic inequality. This question will be examined in the next section.**

3.2. Political Disparities Along Individual Socio-Economic Differences in Countries with Enduring High and Low Wealth Inequality

The previous findings show that citizens in countries with systemic high wealth inequality are less supportive of political institutions, though not significantly less than in other countries, and engage less in non-institutional forms of participation than citizens living in more equal countries. At the individual level, socio-economic position significantly shapes political disparities, with citizens in higher occupational classes, with higher educational attainments, and higher incomes expressing their demands more and being more supportive of political institutions. The next step is to estimate how individual socio-economic differences relate to political

disparities in countries that have an enduringly low level of wealth inequality over the 21st century (Gini ~ 0.65) and an enduringly high level (Gini ~ 0.85).

Figure 5 shows the changes in political support when the individual income increases in countries with enduring low and high wealth inequality. The results indicate that disparities in political trust resulting from income differences do not differ among countries with low and high wealth inequality. Hence, **no matter whether country-level wealth inequality is high or low, individual income has the same impact on disparities in political trust.**

However, the results indicate disparities when it comes to satisfaction with democracy: when the individual income increases, the increase in satisfaction with democracy is much larger in countries with high wealth inequality compared to more equal countries. Consequently, **the gap between citizens with more and less income in how satisfied they are with democracy, is larger in countries that have consistently known high wealth inequality.**

Figure 5. Disparities in Political Support Along Income Cleavages in Countries with Enduring Low and High Wealth Inequality

Note: Bars show the estimated change (on a scale ranged 0-10) in more specific and diffused political support (shown in legend) by a one-standard deviation increase in individual income in countries that averaged a high (Gini ~ 0.85) and low (Gini ~ 0.65) level of wealth inequality over the 21st century. Lines on the bars show the margin of error for the estimated change, meaning lines crossing 0 suggest an estimate is insignificant (change possibly higher or lower). Estimates account for a country's economic performance and control of corruption, as well as other indicators of socio-economic position (education and occupation), political perceptions (public service satisfaction and left-right leaning), and socio-demographic background (gender and age). Multi-level linear modelling techniques were used. Exact effect coefficients and confidence intervals for the interaction models can be found in Appendix C Table 2.
Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

Figure 6 shows the predicted change in participation rate for a given form of participation when individual income increases by one standard deviation in countries with long-term low or high wealth inequality. The results indicate that the largest effect of an income increase in countries with enduring low wealth inequality is on voting turnout, with only slight though significant differences being estimated for institutional and non-institutional participation as well as protest and radical voting. Hence, **for countries that maintained relatively low wealth inequality, disparities in political participation based on income are minimal, except for voter turnout, which still shows a strong positive association.**

On the other hand, countries with an enduringly high level of wealth inequality see notable political disparities along income lines. To illustrate, a one standard deviation increase in income relates to more than a 6% increase in taking up civic, non-institutional, and electoral forms of participation. Moreover, income

differences matter much more for supporting radical and protest political parties in countries that averaged high wealth inequality over the 21st century. In short, **disparities in expressing political demands between income groups are greater when the enduring level of wealth inequality is high, with a higher income relating to higher probabilities to politically participate, but lower probabilities to vote for a radical or protest party.**

Figure 6. Disparities in Expressing Political Demands Along Income Cleavages in Countries with Enduring Low and High Wealth Inequality

Note: Bars show the estimated change in the rate (% of respondents) at which citizens engage in a given form of political participation (shown in legend) by a one-standard deviation increase in individual income in countries that averaged a high (Gini ~ 0.85) and low (Gini ~ 0.65) level of wealth inequality over the 21st century. Lines on the bars show the margin of error for the estimated change, meaning lines crossing 0 suggest an estimate is insignificant (change possibly higher or lower). Estimates account for a country's economic performance and control of corruption, as well as other indicators of socio-economic position (education and occupation), political perceptions (public service satisfaction and left-right leaning), and socio-demographic background (gender and age). Multi-level logistic modelling techniques were used. Exact effect coefficients and confidence intervals for the interaction models can be found in Appendix C Table 2.
Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

Figure 7 shows the estimated extent of disparities in political support by education in countries with low and high wealth inequality. For countries with high wealth inequality, results indicate no significant differences in the level of political support between more and less educated citizens. Rather, it is in countries with low levels of wealth inequality where disparities in political support emerge along educational lines. This holds particularly true for political trust. Thus, **while the individual educational level does not significantly matter for political support in countries with high wealth inequality, a higher educational level is associated with more political support in countries that are more equal in terms of their wealth distribution.**

Figure 7. Disparities in Political Support Along Educational Cleavages in Countries with Enduring Low and High Wealth Inequality

Support Disparities by Education when Wealth Inequality Low and High

Note: Bars show the estimated change (on a scale ranged 0-10) in more specific and diffused political support indicators (shown in legend) by a one-standard deviation increase in individual education in countries that averaged a high (Gini ~ 0.85) and low (Gini ~ 0.65) level of wealth inequality over the 21st century. Lines on the bars show the margin of error for the estimated change, meaning lines crossing 0 suggest an estimate is insignificant (change possibly higher or lower). Estimates account for a country's economic performance and control of corruption, as well as other indicators of socio-economic position (occupation and income), political perceptions (public service satisfaction and left-right leaning), and socio-demographic background (gender and age). Multi-level linear modelling techniques were used. Exact effect coefficients and confidence intervals for the interaction models can be found in Appendix C Table 3.
Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

Figure 8 in turn, displays disparities in expressing political demands resulting from educational differences for countries with low and high wealth inequality. When examining non-electoral forms of participation, there is no significant difference between countries in the relationship between education, on the one hand, and civic and non-institutional participation on the other. This suggests **the manner that education facilitates greater readiness to take up civic and non-institutional means of participation is comparable in countries with long-term low and high wealth inequality.**

The picture looks different for institutional and electoral participation. Interestingly, it is not in countries with high wealth inequality, but rather in countries with low wealth inequality that education has a stronger positive effect on the probability to express political demands via institutionalised means of participation and voting. Accordingly, **disparities in rates of conventional political participation related to educational differences are smaller in countries with high wealth inequality.**

To recall, the previous findings showed a marginal difference in protest voting, where more educated citizens support protest parties slightly less. Adding to this, the results below show that a higher educational level relates to a greater likelihood of supporting a protest party when a country's systemic wealth inequality is high, while it relates to a reduced likelihood when inequality is low. This may suggest that more educated voters are more likely to show their frustration with traditional political parties in the voting booth when the country has high wealth inequality. Hence, **there is reduced support for traditional political institutions in countries with high wealth inequality amongst higher educated citizens, while less educated citizens are more likely to support protest parties when inequality is low.**

Figure 8. Disparities in Expressing Political Demands Along Educational Cleavages in Countries with Enduring Low and High Wealth Inequality

Participation Disparities by Education when Wealth Inequality Low and High

Note: Bars show the estimated change in the rate (% of respondents) at which citizens engage in a given form of political participation (shown in legend) by a one-standard deviation increase in individual education in countries that averaged a high (Gini ~ 0.85) and low (Gini ~ 0.65) level of wealth inequality over the 21st century. Lines on the bars show the margin of error for the estimated change, meaning lines crossing 0 suggest an estimate is insignificant (change possibly higher or lower). Estimates account for a country's economic performance and control of corruption, as well as other indicators of socio-economic position (occupation and income), political perceptions (public service satisfaction and left-right leaning), and socio-demographic background (gender and age). Multi-level logistic modelling techniques were used. Exact effect coefficients and confidence intervals for the interaction models can be found in Appendix C Table 3.

Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

Figure 9 indicates the predicted disparities in political support between the lowest and other occupational groups in countries with low and high wealth inequality. Comparing skilled service workers with blue-collar and unskilled service workers, findings indicate that there is no significant difference in the level of political support in countries with high wealth inequality. In more equal countries, in contrast, skilled service workers are more likely to be supportive of political institutions and be satisfied with democracy than blue-collar and unskilled service workers. Hence, **differences between the two lowest occupational classes in political support disappear in countries with high wealth inequality.**

In general, differences in how much citizens of different occupational classes trust their political institutions are smaller in countries with high wealth inequality. In contrast, the disparity in satisfaction with the functioning of democracy between capital accumulators and blue-collar or unskilled service workers is larger in countries with high levels of wealth inequality. Looking at the other occupational classes, differences between low-level and high-level wealth inequality countries are minimal or non-existent. This suggest that **disparities in support for day-to-day politics are diminished in countries with high wealth inequality, while disparities in support for the broader political system are equal or – in the case of the highest occupational class - amplified.**

Figure 9. Disparities in Political Support Along Occupational Cleavages in Countries with Enduring Low and High Wealth Inequality

Note: Bars show the estimated change (on a scale ranged 0-10) in more specific and diffused political support indicators (shown in legend) based on their occupational class relative to the lowest occupational class (Blue-Collar and Unskilled Service Workers) in countries that averaged high (Gini ~ 0.85) and low (Gini ~ 0.65) wealth inequality over the 21st century. Lines on the bars show the margin of error for the estimated change, meaning lines crossing 0 suggest an estimate is insignificant (change possibly higher or lower). Estimates account for a country's economic performance and control of corruption, as well as other indicators of socio-economic position (education and income), political perceptions (public service satisfaction and left-right leaning), and socio-demographic background (gender and age). Multi-level linear modelling techniques were used. Exact effect coefficients and confidence intervals for the interaction models can be found in Appendix C Table 4.
Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

Figure 10 shows the estimated disparities in political participation between citizens who are blue-collar or unskilled service workers and citizens in other occupational classes in a context of high and low long-term wealth inequality. The main finding is that across occupational classes, the impact of country-level inequality on the relationship between occupational class and political participation is rather diffuse. However, some trends can be discerned. First, apart from protest and radical voting, the relation between occupational class and political participation seems to be (somewhat) stronger in countries with high wealth inequality. Concretely, **disparities in political participation between blue-collar or unskilled service workers and higher occupational classes are amplified in countries with high wealth inequality.**

Second, disparities in support for protest parties between blue-collar and unskilled service workers on the one hand, and capital accumulators as well as skilled service workers on the other, are diminished in countries with high wealth inequality. Yet, the difference in support for radical political parties between skilled service workers and blue-collar or unskilled service workers remains unchanged by the systemic wealth inequality level. Interestingly, there is one exception: disparities between blue-collar and unskilled service workers and socio-cultural professionals in the probability to vote for a protest or radical party are amplified when wealth inequality is high. **Overall, however, occupation-based disparities in voting for protest parties are smaller in countries with persistently high wealth inequality. In these contexts, blue-collar and unskilled service workers are less likely to vote for protest parties than they are in countries with low wealth inequality.**

Figure 10. Disparities in Expressing Political Demands Along Occupational Cleavages in Countries with Enduringly Low and High Wealth Inequality

Note: Bars show the estimated change in the rate (% of respondents) at which citizens engage in a given form of political participation (shown in legend) based on their occupational class relative to the lowest occupational class (Blue-Collar and Unskilled Service Workers) in countries that averaged high (Gini ~ 0.85) and low (Gini ~ 0.65) wealth inequality over the 21st century. Estimates account for a country's economic performance and control of corruption, as well as other indicators of socio-economic position (education and income), political perceptions (public service satisfaction and left-right leaning), and socio-demographic background (gender and age). Error bars are not shown as they are misleading due to the insignificant effects of between-country wealth inequality differences. Multi-level logistic modelling techniques were used. Exact effect coefficients and confidence intervals for the interaction models can be found in Appendix C Table 4.
Sources: World Inequality Dataset, OECD, World Governance Indicators, European Social Survey.

In all, the findings above can be summarised as follows. *Holding all other variables constant (section 3.1)*, (i) countries with enduringly high wealth inequality tend to have lower rates of political support and lower rates of non-institutional participation; (ii) in years where wealth inequality in a country is higher than the average, countries have significantly lower rates of electoral and institutional participation, significantly higher rates of non-institutional and civic participation, significantly higher rates of protest voting, and significantly lower levels of political support; and (iii) citizens with (a) less income, (b) with lower educational attainments, and (c) in lower occupational classes have significantly lower rates of electoral, institutional, non-institutional, and civic participation, and lower levels of political support. On the other hand, mainly citizens with less income and in lower occupational classes engage more in protest voting. *In countries that had high wealth inequality over the 21st century (section 3.2),* (i) disparities in each form of political participation between citizens with more and less income are *amplified*, while only disparities in satisfaction with democracy, and not political trust, are *greater*; (ii) disparities in institutionalised and electoral participation, as well as political support, between more and less educated citizens are *dampened*, while disparities in civic and non-institutional participation remain similar, with an increase in educational level relating to more protest voting when accounting for income and occupation; and (iii) disparities in political participation, as well as satisfaction with democracy, between citizens in higher (capital accumulators and socio-cultural professionals) and lower (skilled service, unskilled service, and blue-collar workers) occupational classes remain the same or are *amplified*, though disparities in political trust are *reduced*.

To check if the findings hold up, different models were assessed. **Appendix C** reports these models, presenting results on how within-country changes of wealth inequality change the link between socio-economic standing and political support or participation, as well as models using within- and between-country differences in the disposable income Gini coefficient instead of wealth. First, analyses of within-country

changes in wealth inequality, reflecting the extent of wealth inequality within a country relative to the average level between 2002–2022 as opposed to the systemic inequality level, show limited effects. Political disparities by income and occupation largely remain unchanged, with marginal reductions in non-institutional and electoral participation disparities. Notably, disparities between skilled service workers and blue-collar or unskilled service workers in support for radical and protest parties decline slightly when inequality rises. However, for education, disparities in political participation and support are more pronounced when inequality increases in the short term, indicating that educational cleavages are amplified by short-term spikes in inequality. Second, replacing the indicator of wealth inequality with the disposable income Gini coefficient reveals similar findings as the ones described in this report. These results show that long-term high disposable income inequality amplifies participation gaps along income, education, and occupation lines, though disparities in protest voting and political trust are reduced. Within-country increases in income inequality, however, are associated with higher political participation and reduced protest party support, with only minor changes in disparities along socio-economic cleavages. Finally, **Appendix D** reports further analyses based on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Module 5, 2016-2021). It documents similar cleavages in political support and participation along citizens' socio-economic standing. As the sample size of countries (23 EU-member states) is relatively small, this data is less well-equipped for examining differences between countries based on the level of inequality.

In summary, the results confirm that inequality matters for political disparities, particularly when comparing long-term structural differences in the extent of economic inequality between countries. Greater inequality between countries exacerbates socio-economic divides in political participation, while also narrowing gaps in protest voting and political trust.

(4. Conclusion

Economic inequality is placing significant pressure on the stability of democratic systems. Healthy democracies depend on citizens being able to express their needs and having confidence that political institutions will address them (Easton, 1965, 1975). However, when the gap between the wealthiest and the less affluent widens, the opportunities for citizens to engage with political institutions are likely to become increasingly unequal (Goubin & Hooghe, 2020; Solt, 2008, 2010). This imbalance can lead policymakers to prioritise the interests of more influential groups, sidelining the needs of less well-off citizens (Bartels, 2008; Lesschaeve, 2017; Schakel & Hakhverdian, 2018). When people feel that their voices are unheard, trust in political systems erodes, leaving support concentrated among those who benefit from inequalities (Gallego, 2015; Solt, 2008, 2010).

To address these challenges, the INVOLVE Horizon Europe project seeks to identify which citizens are most likely to disengage from politics in contexts of high economic inequality. Its goal is to develop an evidence-base on which policies can ensure that democratic systems are inclusive and responsive to all voices. In that regard, research has shown that higher levels of economic inequality are associated with lower political participation and reduced trust in democratic institutions (Section 1.1). Disadvantaged groups, such as those with lower incomes, educational levels, or occupational standings, are particularly affected, participating less in politics, and showing weaker support for democracy (Section 1.2). Yet, in both more equal and unequal countries, it is citizens that have the time, resources, and social connections that engage more actively in politics, creating a participation gap (Elkjær & Klitgaard, 2024; Gilens, 2012; Rosset et al., 2013). This unequal political playing field reduces trust in political institutions among less affluent citizens (Goubin, 2018; Goubin & Hooghe, 2020). **While the direct relation between country-level economic and individual-level socio-economic inequality on political support and participation has been described extensively in the literature, it remains less clear if and how economic inequality, at the country-level alters political disparities between citizens of different socio-economic standings.**

In this context, this report examined how disparities in political support and participation vary between different contexts of economic inequality and between individuals of different socio-economic standings in present-day Europe. Specifically, this report examines (1) how **economic inequality**, between and within countries, shapes citizens' **political support**, (2) how economic inequality, between and within countries, shapes citizens' **political participation**, and (3) how **economic inequality between countries shapes differences** in political support and participation **between well- and worse-off citizens** in terms of their socio-economic standing. To do so, this report examined data from the World Inequality Dataset, World Governance Indicators, World Bank, OECD, and European Social Survey, covering over 285,000 respondents in 27 European countries between 2002 and 2022.

First, the findings indicate that economic inequalities risk making political support more fragile. When holding other factors that may influence levels of political support constant, increased economic inequality within a country relates to citizens having less trust in their political institutions and being less satisfied with the functioning of their democracy. At the individual level, there is an evident gap in political support as well between well- and worse-off citizens in terms of income, education, and occupation. However, when comparing countries with high and low levels of economic inequality over the 21st century, no significant differences in the levels of political trust and satisfaction with democracy can be discerned. It should be noted, however, that long-term governance quality, as measured by the control countries have over corruption, is a strong determinant of political attitudes, likely impacting the significance levels for the inequality effects. Accordingly, **while systemic levels of economic inequality between countries are not associated with political support rates, changes in economic inequality within countries and individual socio-economic differences are decisive for disparities in political trust and satisfaction with democracy.**

Results further highlight that economic inequalities play an important role in shaping how citizens express their political demands. As with political support, associations were mainly found for greater inequality within countries and differences in individual socio-economic standing. In countries with systemically high economic inequality, only the level of non-institutional participation is significantly lower compared to more equal countries. When it comes to inequality within countries, findings show that citizens engage less in electoral and institutional means of political participation while turning more to non-institutional and civic

participation when economic inequality in their country has risen, in addition to supporting protest political parties more. Comparing individual citizens, it is the more educated and richer citizens in higher occupational classes that express their political demands more via each manner of participation, with one exception: socio-economically worse-off citizens engage more in protest voting. Hence, **as inequality within a country grows, citizens disengage from conventional participation, shifting to non-institutional and civic forms of participation, or even protest voting, while citizens in worse-off socio-economic standings politically participate less overall.**

This report further examines how political disparities between well- and worse-off citizens are different in countries with systemically low and high economic inequality. Two theoretical perspectives were used to understand how country-level economic inequality matters for individual citizens from different socio-economic groups. On the one hand, relative deprivation theory posits that economic inequality deepens status anxiety and resentment among worse-off groups while further privileging well-off groups. This would lead to a greater stratification of political participation and differences in support for democratic institutions (Armingeon & Schädel, 2015; Carella & Ford, 2020; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Runciman, 1966), amplifying political disparities. In support of this theory, the results in this report indicate that in countries with enduringly high economic inequality, it is particularly disparities in satisfaction with democracy based on income and occupational differences that are amplified, though levels of political trust remain comparable. Moreover, income- and occupation-based disparities in participation are notably higher in countries with systemically high inequality. Concretely, in countries with systemic economic inequality, richer citizens resort more to conventional, non-institutional, and civic participation and are also more satisfied with the functioning of their democracy, while worse-off citizens engage more in protest voting, amplifying political disparities.

On the other hand, system justification theory suggests that economic inequality reduces political disparities as disadvantaged individuals tend to justify the system to resolve tensions between their marginalisation and desire to see the system as fair, leading to acceptance of inequality. In contrast, advantaged individuals experience this tension less, making them freer to become critical of an unequal system (Etzioni, 1988; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Van der Toorn, 2012; Wakslak et al., 2007; Willis et al., 2022). In line with this, while the results show that education is positively associated with increased political support in countries with low inequality, this effect is not visible in countries with systemically high inequality. Adding to this, political participation gaps between more and less educated citizens are mainly found in countries with low enduring economic inequality. Hence, differences between less and more educated citizens are diminished by systemically high economic inequality, while they are more prevalent when economic inequality is low. These findings show that the various factors that make up one's socio-economic standing do not necessarily have the same direction of effects on political support and participation when taking country-level inequality into account: **individual differences in income and occupation amplify political disparities in countries struggling to reduce economic inequality, while educational differences matter more when inequality is low.**

This report advises that countries seeking to equalise the democratic playing field focus efforts on strengthening policies that regulate wealth accumulation and market incomes. When economic inequality in a country increases, patterns of political participation shift from conventional participation to non-conventional and protesting forms. Hence, such policies can serve to improve support for democratic institutions and increase the willingness to use institutionalised and electoral means of expressing political preferences and demands. Redistributive measures in particular, such as targeted welfare policies, should seek to mitigate the effects of having a lower income and less advantageous labour market position on political support and participation when economic inequality is high. In such circumstances, political disparities are amplified. However, also in economically more equal societies, political disparities by socio-economic standing can be discerned. More concretely, it is education that enhances differences in political support and participation when economic inequality is low. While it is beyond the scope of this report to seek explanations for these differing effects, it is key to pay particular attention to the lower educated when creating policies that aim to equalise access to political processes for more economically equal countries. Accordingly, **measures to reduce political disparities need to account for the importance of the different components of one's socio-economic standing in each context.**

This report is not without limitations. Foremost, these results are specific to European countries. This means that the level of wealth inequality is rather high in all countries, with only limited changes over time,

while economic development is relatively high. More global differences in systemic economic inequality might show different effects on political disparities should comparisons include countries from multiple continents, with lower or comparable levels of inequality being potentially confounded by higher poverty and unemployment rates. Nonetheless, results reflect the impact of economic inequality amongst overall economically more prosperous countries. Additionally, our analyses of individual differences were confined to the more commonly examined socio-economic indicators, namely income, education, and occupation. Though socio-demographic information was controlled for, more intersectional social disadvantages were not accounted for in the modelling strategy, such as the impact of being an educated affluent ethnic minority woman compared to an uneducated poor white man. Future research is needed to examine whether political disparities along individual social intersections are amplified or diminished in countries facing systemic economic inequality.

As this report highlights, higher levels of economic inequality have a negative impact on political support and participation of all citizens, with particularly less affluent citizens participating less and having lower support. Policies that address wealth accumulation and income disparities can hence help to bridge these gaps, enhancing trust in political institutions and enabling worse-off socio-economic groups to express their demands more. As countries reduce economic inequality, efforts should shift to reducing education-based disparities by improving access to political processes, ensuring that all citizens, regardless of their educational background, can effectively participate in shaping democratic outcomes. **In conclusion, this report underscores the importance of tackling economic inequality to reduce political disparities and fostering more inclusive democracies.**

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Acknowledgements

(Appendix

Appendix A. Detailed overview of data availability and variables

Figure 1. Country-year data availability in the European Social Survey

Availability of Country-Years

Note: At the country level, data is available for each year from 2002 until 2022 for the listed countries.

Table 1. Overview of data sources, the variables used, and their interpretation

Data Source	Variable	Interpretation
World Inequality Dataset (WID)	Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	Wealth refers to the sum of financial assets owned by households after subtracting debt. The Gini Coefficient reflects how unequal wealth is distributed within a country, where 0 means perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality. Between-scores are based on the averaged Wealth Gini Coefficient over the period from 2002 until 2022. Variation captures long-term differences between countries that have enduringly high and low wealth inequality within Europe.
	Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	Wealth refers to the sum of financial assets owned by households after subtracting debt. The Gini Coefficient reflects how unequal wealth is distributed within a country, where 0 means perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality. Within-scores are based on the difference for a given year to the averaged Wealth Gini Coefficient over the period from 2002 until 2022. Variation captures short-term differences within countries when wealth inequality is relatively higher or lower compared to the level averaged from 2002 until 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)	GDP per Capita, between	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total monetary value of all goods and services produced within a country's borders. Per Capita is the GDP averaged over the size of the country's population, expressed in thousands (1 is 1,000). Between-scores are based on the averaged GDP per Capita over the period from 2002 until 2022. Variation captures long-term differences between countries that have a strong and weak economy within Europe.
	GDP per Capita Growth, within	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total monetary value of all goods and services produced within a country's borders. Per Capita is the GDP averaged over the size of the country's population, expressed in thousands (1 is 1,000). Growth is the change in GDP per Capita from year-to-year. Within-scores are based on the difference for a given year to the average GDP Growth over the period from 2002 until 2022. Growth is used as GDP itself increases in a largely linear manner, meaning within-scores based on GDP would increase linearly. Variation captures short-term differences within countries when economic growth is relatively higher or lower compared to the averaged growth rate from 2002 until 2022.
World Bank (WB)	Control of Corruption, between	Control of Corruption is the absence of the extent to which public power is used for private gain, including petty and grand corruption, as well as state capture by elites. Measures are based on a standardised scale ranging from -2.5 to +2.5, based on a global sample of surveys and expert assessments, ensuring comparability across countries and over time, with higher scores reflecting better governance outcomes. Between-scores are based on the average Control of Corruption scores over the period from 2002 until 2022. Variation captures long-term differences between countries that have a strong and weak control over corruption.
	Control of Corruption, within	Control of Corruption is the extent to which public power is used for private gain, including petty and grand corruption, as well as state capture by elites. Measures are based on a standardised scale ranging from -2.5 to +2.5, based on a global sample of surveys and expert assessments, ensuring comparability across countries and over time, with higher scores reflecting better governance outcomes. Within-scores are based on the difference for a given year to the averaged Control of Corruption score over the period from 2002 until 2022.

		Variation captures short-term differences within countries when corruption is getting out or under control.
European Social Survey (ESS)	Objective Income Standardised	Objective Income is based on the survey question "Using this card, if you add up the income from all sources, which letter describes your household's total net income? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income" for the first three waves and "Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income" for the waves after. For the latter, 10 decile groups are used, while the former added two extra categories (11th and 12th). These additional categories for the question in the first three waves have been integrated with the 10th decile for the final variable created for this report following the ESS coding guidelines. Responses are standardised per country, meaning scores are expressed in terms of the average distance to the mean response for a country. Scores reflect how much money a respondent has relative to the average income of households in their country.
	Education Standardised	Education is based on the respondent's educational attainment according to the ISCED scheme, which has 7 ranked categories: 0 not possible to harmonise, 1 less than lower secondary, 2 lower secondary, 3 lower tier upper secondary, 4 upper tier upper secondary, 5 advanced vocational sub-degree, 6 lower tertiary education bachelor level, 7 higher tertiary education master or higher level. Responses are standardised per country, meaning scores are expressed in terms of the average distance to the mean response for a country. Scores reflect how educated a respondent is relative to the average educational level obtained by citizens in their country.
	Occupational Class	Occupation is based on the respondent's occupation according to the post-industrial class scheme. Classes are broader groupings of the Oesch scheme: Capital Accumulators (CAs) = Large employers, Self-employed professionals, Small business owners with employees, Technical experts, Higher-grade managers and administrators; Socio-Cultural Professionals (SCPs) = Socio-cultural professionals, and Socio-cultural semi-professionals; Skilled Service Workers (SSW) = Small business owners without employees, Technicians, Lower-grade managers and administrators, Skilled clerks, Skilled service workers; Blue-Collar or Unskilled Service Workers (BC-USW) = Skilled manual workers, Low-skilled manual workers, Unskilled clerks, Low-skilled service workers. The lowest occupational class, blue-collar and unskilled service workers, are used as the reference group. Groupings reflect the probability that a respondent experiences labour market advantages, unemployment, or atypical employment.
	Gender	Gender is based on the survey respondent's coding for sex, with the choice of Male, Female, or No Answer. No Answer responses are incorporated into the category for women, with men being the reference group.
	Age Grouping	Age groups are based on the respondent's age, reflecting distinct life phases (Youth 15-29, Family Start 30-49, Late Career 50-64, Retirement 65+). The oldest age group (65+) is used as the reference group.
	Left-Right Leaning Standardised	Left-Right Leaning is based on survey questions asking respondents where they would place themselves on a scale from 0 – Left to 10 – Right.

		Responses are standardised per country, meaning scores are expressed in terms of the average distance to the mean response for a country.
		Scores reflect how left- or right-leaning a respondent is relative to the average political leaning of citizens in their country is.
	Public Service Satisfaction Standardised	Public Service Satisfaction is based on survey questions asking respondents how satisfied they are with the state of health and education services in their country.
		Responses to the two questions are averaged per respondent, and standardised per country, meaning scores are expressed in terms of the average distance to the mean response for a country.
		Scores reflect how satisfied a respondent is with the state of key public services relative to how satisfied the average citizen in their country is.
	Satisfaction with Democracy	Satisfaction with Democracy is based on survey questions asking respondents how satisfied they are, on a scale from 0 to 10, with the functioning of (i) democracy and (ii) the government.
		Responses to these questions are summed up and divided by the number of questions answered.
		Scores capture how satisfied citizens are with their democracy.
	Political Trust	Political trust is based on survey questions asking respondents how much they trust, on a scale from 0 to 10, (i) politicians, (ii) political parties, and (iii) the national parliament.
		Responses to these questions are summed up and divided by the number of questions answered.
		Scores capture how trusting citizens are of their democratic representative institutions.
	Institutional Participation	Institutional Participation is based on whether a respondent indicated that during the last 12 months they (i) worn or displayed a badge or sticker of a political party or candidate, (ii) contacted a public official, (iii) donated money to a political group or party, (iv) held a party membership, and/or (v) worked for a political party.
		If respondents indicated that they engaged in one of the activities listed above, they are coded as having engaged in institutional participation. Respondents either have (1) or have not (0) engaged in institutional participation.
		At the aggregate, scores reflect the percentage of citizens that engaged in forms of participation that are recognised by and/or are integrated into political institutions.
	Non-Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation is based on whether respondents indicated that during the last 12 months they (i) boycotted a product, (ii) (il)legally protested, (iii) publicly demonstrated, (iv) posted online political content, and/or (v) signed a petition.
		If respondents indicated that they engaged in one of the activities listed above, they are coded as having engaged in non-institutional participation. Respondents either have (1) or have not (0) engaged in non-institutional participation.
		At the aggregate, scores reflect the percentage of citizens that engaged in forms of participation that are outside the functioning of and/or are less recognised by political institutions.
	Civic Participation	Civic Participation is based on whether respondents indicated that during the last 12 months they worked or volunteered for an (not-for-profit or charitable) organisation.
		If respondents indicated that they engaged in the activity listed above, they are coded as having engaged in civic participation. Respondents either have (1) or have not (0) engaged in civic participation.
		At the aggregate, scores reflect the percentage of citizens that engaged in civic forms of participation.
	Electoral Participation	Electoral Participation is based on whether a respondent did (1) or did not (0) vote during the last national election.

		If respondents indicated that they engaged in the activity listed above, they are coded as having engaged in electoral participation. At the aggregate, scores reflect the percentage of citizens that went out to vote.
	Radical Voting	Radical Voting is based on whether respondents did (1) or did not (0) vote for a political party that can be classified as being Populist, Radical Left, and/or Radical Right. A vote for a radical political party suggests that the respondent is expressing the demand to radically change the functioning of political institutions. At the aggregate, scores reflect the percentage of citizens that support radical political parties.
	Protest Voting	Protest Voting is based on whether respondents did (1) or did not (0) vote for a political party that can be classified as being a protest party, which includes radical parties and parties that are protesting against the traditional political order. A vote for a protest political party suggests that the respondent is expressing discontent with traditional political parties. At the aggregate, scores reflect the percentage of citizens that used their vote to protest.

Appendix B. Coding of Populist, Radical Left, Radical Right, and Protest Parties

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
Austria	FPÖ (Freedom Party; Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs)	Prtvtat = 3; Prtvtaat = 3; Prtvtbat = 3; Prtvtcat = 3; Prtvtdat = 3	X		X	
	BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria; Bündnis Zukunft Österreich)	Prtvtaat = 4; prtvtbat = 4	X		X until '08	
	Pilz (Now – Pilz List; JETZT - Liste Pilz)	Prtvtcat = 4	X			
	TS (Team Stronach)	Prtvtbat = 9	X			
	KPÖ (Communist Party of Austria; Kommunistiche Partei Österreichs)	Prtvtaat = 7; prtvtbat = 6; prtvtcat = 6		X*		
	Other (Including Pirate Party, G!LT)	Prtvtat = 6; Prtvtaat = 8; Prtvtbat = 8,10; Prtvtcat = 8,9; Prtvtdat = 8				X
Belgium	N-VA (New Flemish Alliance; Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie)	Prtvtabe = 3; Prtvtcbe = 3; Prtvtdbe = 3; Prtvtebe =3	X*		X*	
	PVDA/PTB (Workers' Party of Belgium; Partij van de Arbeid – Parti du Travail)	Prtvtbe = 7,16; Prtvtcbe = 6; Prtvtdbe = 6; Prtvtebe = 5; Prtvtcbe = 14; Prtvtdbe = 14; Prtvtebe = 12		X		
	VB (Flemish Interest; Vlaams Belang)	Prtvtbe = 8; Prtvtabe = 7; Prtvtbbe = 7;	X		X	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		Prtvtcbe = 7; Prtvtdbe = 7; Prtvtebe = 6				
	FN (National Front; Front National)	Prtvtbe = 15; Prtvtabe = 11; Prtvtbbe = 11; Prtvtcbe = 11; Prtvtdbe = 11	X		X	
	LDD (List Dedecker ; Lijst Dedecker)	Prtvtbbe= 4; Prtvtcbe= 4; Prtvtdbe= 4	X			
	PP (People's Party; Parti Populaire)	Prtvtcbe = 15; Prtvtdbe= 15	X		X	
	PNPb (Party for New Politics in Belgium; Partij voor een Nieuwe Politiek in België)	Prtvtbe =4	X		X	
	Other (Including RESIST), Blanco, Invalid Vote	Prtvtbe = 17; Prtvtabe =4,14,15,16; Prtvtbbe = 14,15,16; Prtvtcbe = 16,17,18; Prtvtdbe = 17,18,19; Prtvtebe = 14,15,16				X
Bulgaria	GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria; Grazhdani za Evropeysko Razvitie na Bulgariya)	Prtvtbbg =1; Prtvtcbg = 1; Prtvtdbg = 1; Prtvtebg = 1	X			
	Vazrazhdane (Revival; Vazrazhdane)	Prtvtdbg = 11; Prtvtebg = 9	X		X	
	Ataka (Attack; Ataka)	Prtvtbg = 10; Prtvtabg = 10; Prtvtbbg = 5; Prtvtcbg = 3; Prtvtdbg = 3; Prtvtebg = 8	X		X	
	BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party; Balgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya)	Prtvtbg = 1; Prtvtabg = 1; Prtvtbbg = 2; prtvtcbg= 2;			X*	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		prtvtdbg= 2; prtvtebg = 2				
	VMRO (Bulgarian National Movement; Balgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie)	Prtvtcbg = 5; Prtvtdbg = 3; Prtvtebg = 6;	X		X	
	ITN (There is Such a People; Ima Takav Narod)	Prtvtebg = 5	X			
	ISBG (Stand Up BG; Izpravi se.BG)	Prtvtebg = 10	X			
	NFSB (National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria; Natsionalen Front za Spasenie na Balgariya)	Prtvtcbg = 7; Prtvtdbg = 3; Prtvtebg = 7	X		X	
	NDSV (National Movement for Stability and Progress; Natsionalno Dvizhenie za Stabilnost i Vazhod)	Prtvtbg = 5; Prtvtabg = 5; Prtvtbbg = 7	X			
	RZS (Order, Law, and Justice; Red, Zakonnost i Spravedlivost)	Prtvtbbg = 6; Prtvtcbg = 4	X		X	
	Volya (will; Volya)	Prtvtdbg = 5; Prtvtebg = 7	X		X	
	Other or Invalid/Blanco	Prtvtbg = 11; Prtvtabg = 11; Prtvtbbg = 16,17; Prtvtcbg = 13; Prtvtdbg = 12,13; Prtvtebg = 12,13				X
Croatia	BzH (Bloc for Croatia; Blok za Hrvatsku)	Prtvtbhr =3; Prtvtchr =3;	X		X	
	DP (Homeland Movement; Domovinski Pokret)	Prtvtbhr =3; Prtvtchr =3;	X		X	
	HKS (Croatian Conservative Party; Hrvatska Konzervativna Stranka)	Prtvtbhr =3; Prtvtahr =7; Prtvtchr =3;	X		X	
	HDSSB (Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja; Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje)	Prtvtahr =7;	X		X*	
	Hrast (Croatian Growth; Hrvatski rast)	Prtvtbhr =3; Prtvtchr =3;	X		X	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
	HS (Croatian Sovereigntists; Hrvatski Suverenisti)	Prtvtbhr =3; Prtvtchr =3;	X		X	
	Most (Bridge; Most)	Prtvtahr =3; Prtvtbhr =4; Prtvtchr =4;	X		X*	
	Mozemo (We Can!; Mozemo!)	Prtvtbhr =5; Prtvtchr =5;	X	X		
	BM365 (Bandic Milan 365 – Labour and Solidarity Party; Bandić Milan 365 – Stranka Rada i Solidarnosti)	Prtvtahr =5;	X			
	HSP (Croatian Party of Rights; Hrvatska Stranka Prava)	Prtvthr =9;			X	
	ZZ (Human Shield; Živi zid)	Prtvtahr =4;	X			
	Other or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvthr = 11; Prtvtahr = 10; Prtvtbhr = 10				X
Czech Republic	ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens; Akce nespokojených obcanu)	Prtvtdcz =4; Prtvtecz = 4	X			
	SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy; Svoboda a prímá demokracie)	Prtvtecz = 8	X		X	
	KSCM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; Komunistická strana Cech a Moravy)	Prtvtcz = 9; Prtvtacz = 1; Prtvtbcz= 1; Prtvtccz= 1; Prtvtdcz= 1; Prtvtecz = 1		X		
	SPR-RSC (Rally for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia; Sdruzení pro republiku - Republikánská strana Ceskoslovenska)	Prtvtcz = 4			X	
	Usvit (Dawn; Úsvit)	Prtvtdcz = 7	X		X	
	VV (Public Affairs; Veci verejné)	Prtvtbcz = 6; Prtvtccz = 4	X			
	Other (Including Hope, Association of Independents, Pirate Party)	Prtvtcz = 3,7,12,14; Prtvtacz = 6; Prtvtbcz = 8;				X

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		Prtvtccz =8; Prtvtdcz = 8; Prtvtecz = 7,10				

Denmark	DF (Danish People's Party; Dansk Folkeparti)	Prtvtdk =6;
		prtvtadk = 6;
		prtvtbdk =5;
		prtvtcdk =5;
		prtvtddk = 5
			X		X	

	En-O (Red-Green Alliance; Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne)	Prtvtdk = 10;
		prtvtadk = 10;
		prtvtbdk = 9;
		prtvtcdk = 9;
		prtvtddk = 9
				X		

	SF (Social People's Party; Socialistisk Folkeparti)	Prtvtdk =5;
		prtvtadk = 5;
		prtvtbdk =4;
		prtvtcdk =4;
		prtvtddk = 4
				X*		

	FrP (Progress Party; Fremskridtspartiet)	Prtvtdk = 9; prtvtadk = 9	X			

	Other (Including Alternativet)	Prtvtdk = 11;
		prtvtadk = 11;
		Prtvtbdk = 10;
		prtvtcdk = 10;
		prtvtddk = 10,11
						X

Estonia	EK (Estonian Centre Party; Eesti Keskerakond)	Prtvtee =2; Prtvtaee =2; Prtvtbee =2; Prtvtcee =2; Prtvtdee =2; Prtvteee =2; Prtvtfee =2; Prtvtgee =2; Prtvthee = 2;	X*			
	EKRE (Conservative People's Party of Estonia; Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond)	Prtvtdee = 4; Prtvteee =6; Prtvtfee =6; Prtvtgee =6;	X		X	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		Prtvthee = 6				
	EIP (Estonian Independence Party; Eesti Iseseisvuspartei)	Prtvtee = 9; Prtvtbee = 9; Prtvtcee = 8; Prtvtdee = 8; Prtvteee = 9; Prtvtfee = 9; Prtvtgee = 9			X	
	ERP (Res Publica Party; Erakond Res Publica)	Prtvtee =1; Prtvtdee = 1; Prtvteee = 3; Prtvtfee = 3; Prtvtgee = 3	X			
	Other (Including Eesti 200, Future Party, Free Party, People's Unity Party, No One's Choice)	Prtvtee = 12,13; Prtvtaee = 7; Prtvtbee = 11; Prtvtcee = 7,10,11; Prtvtdee = 10,11; Prtvteee = 10; Prtvtfee = 10,11,12; Prtvtgee =10,11,12,13; Prtvthee = 10,11,13,15,35				X
Finland	VAS (Left Alliance; Demokraattinen Liitto | Vasemmistoliitto)	Prtvtfi = 10; Prtvtafi = 9; Prtvtbfi = 15; Prtvtcfi = 14; Prtvtdfi = 12; Prtvtefi = 18; Prtvtffi = 7;		X*		
	LiiK (Movement Now; Liike Nyt)	Prtvtefi = 8; Prtvtffi = 16;	X			
	PS (Finns Party; Suomen Maaseudun Puolue | Perussuomalaiset)	Prtvtfi = 5; Prtvtafi = 5; Prtvtbfi = 5; Prtvtcfi = 4; Prtvtdfi = 4; Prtvtefi = 5; Prtvtffi = 8;	X		X	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
	Finnish People's Blue-Whites/ Finnish People First	Prtvtbfi = 8; Prtvtefi = 9; Prtvtffi = 15,22;			X	
	Communist Party & Communist Workers' Party	Prtvtfi = 11,12; Prtvtafi = 10,11; Prtvtbfi = 16, 17; Prtvtcfi = 15,16; Prtvtdfi = 13,14; Prtvtefi = 19,20; Prtvtffi = 18;		X		
	Pirate Party	Prtvtcfi = 8; Prtvtdfi = 7; Prtvtefi = 10; Prtvtffi = 10;	X*			
	Other (Including Free Finland, 7S, Freedom Party, Patriotic People's Movement, Change 2011, For Balance, Open Party, Independence Party, For the Poor, Natural Law Party, Feminist Party, Power Belongs to the People, Freedom Alliance) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtfi = 7,13,14; Prtvtafi = 12; Prtvtbfi = 7,11,12,19; Prtvtcfi = 6,5,8,10,11,18; Prtvtdfi = 6,7,8,9,16; Prtvtefi = 10,12,17,20,21,24				X
France	DLR/DLF (Republic Arise | France Arise; Debout la république | Debout la France)	Prtvtdfr = 10 ; Prtvtefr = 10 ; Prtvtffr = 7	X		X*	
	FN/RN (National Front/Rally; Front National / Rassemblement National)	Prtvtfr = 3 ; Prtvtafr = 3 ; Prtvtbfr = 2 ; Prtvtcfr = 2 ; Prtvtdfr = 11 ; Prtvtefr = 11 ; Prtvtffr = 8	X		X	
	FI (Unsubmissive France; La France Insoumise)	Prtvtdfr = 4 ; Prtvtefr = 4 ; Prtvtffr = 3	X	X		
	PCF (French Communist Party; Parti Communiste Français)	Prtvtfr = 9 ; Prtvtafr = 9 ; Prtvtbfr = 7 ;		X		

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		Prtvtdfr = 3 ; Prtvtefr = 3				
	LO (Workers' Struggle; Lutte ouvrière)	Prtvtfr = 5 ; Prtvtafr = 5 ; Prtvtbfr = 4 ; Prtvtcfr = 5 ; Prtvtdfr = 1 ; Prtvtefr = 1 ; Prtvtffr = 1		X		
	LCR (League of Communist Revolutionaries; Ligue communiste révolutionnaire)	Prtvtfr = 4 ; Prtvtafr = 4 ; Prtvtbfr = 3		X*		
	MPF (Movement for France; Mouvement pour la France)	Prtvtfr = 8 ; Prtvtafr = 8 ; Prtvtbfr = 5 ; Prtvtcfr = 8 ;			X*	
	RPF (Rally for France; Rassemblement pour la France)	Prtvtfr = 11 ; Prtvtafr = 11			X*	
	Reconquete (Reconquete; Reconquete)	Prtvtffr = 9	X		X	
	Other (Including Un candidat divers gauche/droite, NPA), blanc, or missing	Prtvtfr = 16 ; Prtvtafr = 16,17 ; Prtvtbfr = 14,15,16,17,18 ; Prtvtcfr = 4,14,15,16 ; Prtvtdfr = 2,12 ; Prtvtefr = 2,12,13,14				X

Germany	AfD (Alternative for Germany;
	Alternative für Deutschland)
		prtvede2 = 6;
		prtvfde2 = 6;
		prtvgde2 = 6
			X		X	

	Linke (The Left; **PDS** / Die Linke)	prtvde2 = 5;
		prtvade2 = 5;
		prtvbde2= 5
			X	X		

	Linke (The Left; PDS / **Die Linke**)	prtvcde2 = 5;
		prtvdde2 = 5;
		prtvede2 = 3;
		prtvfde2 = 3;
		prtvgde2 = 3
			X*	X*		

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest

	Republikaner (Republicans; Republikaner)	prtvde2 = 6;
		prtvade2 = 6;
		prtvbde2 = 6;
		prtvcde2 = 6;
		prtvdde2 = 6
			X		X	

	Other (Including Pirate Party, Die Basis, Die Partei, Free Voters) or Blanco/Invalid	prtvde2 = 7;
		prtvade2 = 8;
		prtvbde2 = 8;
		prtvcde2 = 8,9;
		prtvdde2 = 7,9;
		prtvede2 = 7;
		prtvfde2 = 7,8,9,55;
						X

Greece	EL (Greek Solution; Ελληνική Λύση)	Prtvtdgr = 5; Prtvtegr = 5	X		X	
	MeRa25 (European Realistic Disobedience Front; European Realistic Disobedience Front)	Prtvtdgr = 6; Prtvtegr =11	X	X		
	KKE (Communist Party of Greece; Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas)	Prtvtgr = 3; Prtvtagr = 3; Prtvtbgr = 3; Prtvtcgr = 3; Prtvtdgr = 4; Prtvtegr = 4		X		
	SYRIZA (The Coalition of the Radical Left; Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás)	Prtvtgr = 4; Prtvtagr = 4; Prtvtbgr = 4; Prtvtcgr = 5; Prtvtdgr = 2; Prtvtegr = 2	X	X until '15		
	DIKKI (Democratic Social Movement; Δημοκρατικό Κοινωνικό Κίνημα)	Prtvtgr = 5; Prtvtagr = 5	X	X		
	LAOS (Popular Orthodox Rally; Laïkós Orthódoxos Synagermós)	Prtvtagr = 6; Prtvtbgr = 5; Prtvtcgr = 4; Prtvtegr = 12	X		X	
	GD (Golden Dawn; Laikos Syndesmos – Chrysi Avgi)	Prtvtcgr = 10; Prtvtdgr = 7	X*		X	
	Spartans (Spartans; Σπαρτιάτες)	Prtvtegr = 6	X*		X	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
	Other (Including Antarsya, Sail of Freedom, Niki, KOTES, SPITHA) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtgr = 6; Prtvtagr = 7; Prtvtbgr = 7; Prtvtcgr = 7,8,9,12,13,14; Prtvtdgr = 8,31; Prtvtegr = 7,8,9,32,33				X
Hungary	Fidesz (Fidesz; Fidesz)	Prtvtahu = 1; Prtvtbhu = 1; Prtvtchu = 1; Prtvtdhu = 3; Prtvtehu = 1; Prtvtfhu = 3; Prtvtghu = 3; Prtvthhu = 6	X		X (from '10)	
	Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary; Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom)	Prtvtahu = 3; Prtvtbhu = 3; Prtvtchu = 11 Prtvtdhu = 4; Prtvtehu = 2; Prtvtfhu = 4; Prtvtghu = 4; Prtvthhu = 1;	X		X (until '18)	
	FKgP (Independent SmallHolders' Party; Független Kisgazdapárt)	Prtvthu = 3;	X		X (from '19)	
	MIEP (Hungarian Justice and Life Party; Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja)	Prtvthu = 4; Prtvtahu = 3; Prtvtbhu = 3; Prtvtchu = 3; Prtvtdhu = 7	X		X	
	MMP (Hungarian Workers' Party; Magyar Munkáspárt)	Prtvthu = 6; Prtvtahu = 5; Prtvtbhu = 5; Prtvtchu = 5; Prtvtdhu = 10; Prtvtehu = 5; Prtvtfhu = 8; Prtvtghu = 8		X		

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
	Other (Including ISHP, NEP, MKKP, Roma) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvthu = 3,8; Prtvtahu = 8; Prtvtbhu = 9,10,16; Prtvtchu = 9,10,55; Prtvtdhu = 11,55; Prtvtehu = 55; Prtvtfhu = 11,55; Prtvtghu = 10,55; Prtvthhu = 2,3,55				X
Iceland	FIF (People's Party; Flokkur fólksins)	Prtvtbis = 4; Prtvtcis = 13; Prtvtdis = 4; Prtvteis = 2	X			
	FSF (Progressive Party; Framsóknarflokkurinn)	Prtvtais = 2; Prtvtbis = 2	X* ('09-'16)			
	M (Centre Party; Miðflokkurinn)	Prtvtcis = 8; Prtvtdis = 6; Prtvteis = 5	X			
	B-H (Civic Movement; Borgarahreyfingin)	Prtvtais = 6	X			
	SFI (Icelandic Socialist Party; Sósíalistaflokkur Íslands)	Prtvtdis = 13; Prtvteis = 9	X	X		
	Other (Including Pirate Party, Households' Party, LGM, DM, Responsible Future) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtis = 7,9,10; Prtvtais = 4,7,8; Prtvtbis = 6,11,14,15; Prtvtcis = 6,15,20; Prtvtdis = 7,15,55; Prtvteis = 1,6;				X
Ireland	SF (We Ourselves; Sinn Féin)	Prtvtie = 6; Prtvtaie = 7; Prtvtbie = 7; Prtvtcie = 7; Prtvtdie = 4; Prtvteie =4	X			
	SP (Socialist Party)	Prtvtaie = 8; Prtvtbie = 9; Prtvtcie = 9; Prtvtdie = 7;		X		

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		Prtvteie =7				
	WP (Workers' Party)	Prtvtaie = 9; Prtvtdie = 13		X		
	Others (Including PBP, Independent, Indepents4Chang) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtie = 7,8; Prtvtaie = 4,6,10; Prtvtbie = 1,5,10; Prtvtcie = 1,5,10; Prtvtdie = 5,8,11,14; Prtvteie =5,8,12				X
Italy	FI (Let's Go Italy; Forza Italia)	Prtvtit = 8; Prtvtait = 8; Prtvtbit = ; Prtvtcit = 8; Prtvtdit = 4; Prtvteit = 5	X*			
	FdI (Brothers of Italy; Fratelli d'Italia)	Prtvtbit = 10; Prtvtcit = 10; Prtvtdit = 5; Prtvteit = 1	X*		X	
	Lega (Northern League; Lega (Nord))	Prtvtit = 11; Prtvtait = 11; Prtvtbit = 9; Prtvtcit = 9; Prtvtdit = 3; Prtvteit = 4	X		X	
	LeU (Free and Equal; Liberi e Uguali)	Prtvtcit = 6; Prtvtdit = 6	X	X*		
	M5S (Five Star Movement; Movimento 5 Stelle)	Prtvtbit = 4; Prtvtcit = 7; Prtvtdit = 1; Prtvteit = 3	X			
	AN (National Alliance; Alleanza Nazionale)	Prtvtit = 9; Prtvtait = 9	X		X	
	PDL (House of Freedom; Il Popolo della Libertà)	Prtvtbit = 8	X*			
	LD-FT (The Right-Tricolor Flame; La Destra - Fiamma Tricolore); MSFT	Prtvtit = 16; Prtvtait = 16; Prtvtbit = 13	X*		X	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
	(Social Movement Tricolour Flame ; Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore)					
	IdV (di Pietro's list - Italy of Values; Lista Di Pietro - Italia dei Valori)	Prtvtit = 13; Prtvtait = 13	X			
	PDCI (Party of Italian Communists; Partito dei Comunisti Italiani)	Prtvtit = 3; Prtvtait = 3		X		
	PRC (Communist Refoundation Party; Partito della Rifondazione Comunista)	Prtvtit = 7; Prtvtait = 7		X		
	RC (Civil Revolution; Rivoluzione Civile)	Prtvtbit = 3	X	X		
	SEL (Left Ecology and Freedom; Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà)	Prtvtbit = 2		X		
	Other (Including Italexit, UP, PaP)	Prtvtit = 17,70; Prtvtait = 17,18,70; Prtvtbit = 14; Prtvtcit = 12,14; Prtvtdit = 9,31,32; Prtvteit = 9,10,11,31				X
Latvia	LPV (Latvia First; Latvija Pirmajā Vietā)	Prtvtlv = 5; Prtvtblv = 12	X			
	NA (National Alliance; Nacionālā Apvienība)	Prtvtalv = 4; Prtvtblv = 11			X	
	New Harmony (Motherland; Dzimtene (now Jaunā Saskaņa))	Prtvtalv = 9; Prtvtblv = 7	X	X		
	JL (New Era; Jaunais Laiks)	Prtvtlv = 3	X			
	KPV LVPCL (Who Owns the State?; Kam Pieder Valsts? (now Par Cilv?c?gu Latviju))	Prtvtalv = 15	X			
	TB / LNNK (For Fatherland and Freedom; Tevzemei un Brivibai / LNNK)	Prtvtlv = 6; Prtvtalv = 4; Prtvtblv = 11	X		X	
	Other (Including Action Party, Centrist Party, altern, servants to Latvia, Sovereign Power, Stability, For Each and Every,Republika) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtlv = 8; Prtvtalv = 3,6,12,14,17 Prtvtblv = 4,5,8,9,14,19,20				X
Lithuania	DK (The Way of Courage; Drasos Kelias)	prtvalt1 = 6; prtvblt1 = 9;	X			

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		prtvclt1 = 1;				
	FRONTAS (Front Party; Fronto Partija)	prtvlt1 = 3		X		

	JL (Young Lithuania; Jaunoji Lietuva)	prtvlt1 = 15;
		prtvalt1 = 15;
		prtvblt1 = 4
					X	

	LCP (Lithuanian Centre Party; Lietuvos Centro Partija)	prtvlt1 = 4; prtvclt1 = 6;	X			
	LLS (Lithuanian Freedom Union; Lietuvos Laisvės Sąjunga)	prtvblt1 = 3			X	
	TPP (National Resurrection Party; Tautos Prisikelimo Partija)	prtvlt1 = 9	X			

	TT (Order and Justice; Tvarka ir Teisingumas)	prtvlt1 = 13;
		prtvalt1 = 9;
		prtvblt1 = 5;
			X			

	Other (Including JL, LLS) or Blanco/Invalid	prtvlt1 = 44,55;
		prtvalt1 = 44,55;
		prtvblt1 = 61,62,63;
		prtvclt1 = 65;
						X

Netherlands	BBB (Farmer-Citizen Movement; BoerBurgerBeweging)	Prtvthnl = 17; Prtvtinl = 17	X		X*	
	FvD (Forum for Democracy; Forum voor Democratie)	Prtvtgnl = 13; Prtvthnl = 13; Prtvtinl = 13	X		X	
	JA21 (Right Answer 21; Juiste Antwoord 21)	Prtvthnl = 16; Prtvtinl = 16	X		X	
	PVV (Party for Freedom; Partij voor de Vrijheid)	Prtvtcnl = 11; Prtvtdnl = 3; Prtvtenl = 3; Prtvtfnl = 3; Prtvtgnl = 3; Prtvthnl = 3; Prtvtinl = 3	X		X	
	SP (Social Party; Socialistische Partij)	Prtvtnl = 7; Prtvtanl = 7; Prtvtbnl = 7; Prtvtcnl = 7; Prtvtdnl = 5;	X*	X*		

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		Prtvtenl = 5; Prtvtfnl = 4; Prtvtgnl = 4; Prtvthnl = 4; Prtvtinl = 4				
	LN (Livable Netherlands; Leefbaar Nederland)	Prtvtnl = 9; Prtvtanl = 9; Prtvtbnl = 9; Prtvtcnl = 9;	X			
	LPF (List Pim Fortuyn; Lijst Pim Fortuyn)	Prtvtnl = 4; Prtvtanl = 4; Prtvtbnl = 4; Prtvtcnl = 4;	X			
	Other (Including DENK, Article 1/Bij1, TON, Pirate Party) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtnl = 11; Prtvtanl = 12,13; Prtvtbnl = 11,12; Prtvtcnl = 13,14; Prtvtdnl = 11,12,13; Prtvtenl = 11,13,14; Prtvtfnl = 16,17; Prtvtgnl = 12,14,16,17; Prtvthnl = 12,13,18,31; Prtvtinl = 12,14,18,31				X
Norway	FrP (Progress Party; Fremskrittspartiet)	Prtvtno = 8; Prtvtano = 8; Prtvtbno = 8; Prtvtcno = 8	X		X*	
	Rodt (Red Party; Rødt)	Prtvtno = 1; Prtvtano = 1; Prtvtbno = 1; Prtvtcno = 1	X* (from '12)	X		
	SV (Socialist Left Party; Sosialistisk Venstreparti)	Prtvtno = 2; Prtvtano = 2; Prtvtbno = 2; Prtvtcno = 2		X*		
	Kp (Coastal Party; Kystpartiet)	Prtvtno = 9; Prtvtano = 9; Prtvtbno = 9	X*			

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
	Other (including Pasientfokus) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtno = 10; Prtvtano = 10; Prtvtbno = 11; Prtvtcno = 10,11				X
Portugal	BE (Left Bloc; Bloco de Esquerda)	Prtvtpt = 1; Prtvtapt = 1; Prtvtbpt = 1; Prtvtcpt = 2; Prtvtdpt = 2; Prtvtept = 3		X*		
	Chega (Enough; Chega)	Prtvtdpt = 4; Prtvtept = 5	X		X	
	PCP (Portuguese Communist Party; Partido Comunista Português)	Prtvtpt = 5; Prtvtapt = 3; Prtvtbpt = 4; Prtvtcpt = 3; Prtvtdpt = 12; Prtvtept = 14		X		
	Other (Including RIR) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtpt = 12,13; Prtvtapt = 12,13; Prtvtbpt = 12,13; Prtvtcpt = 17,18; Prtvtdpt = 21,22,23; Prtvtept = 2,20,22,23				X
Poland	KORWiN (Konfederacja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolnosc i Nadzieja; Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic - Freedom and Hope)	Prtvtapl = 8; Prtvtdpl = 1			x	
	Konfederacja (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość; Confederation Freedom and Independence)	Prtvtepl = 3; Prtvtfpl = 5			x	
	Kukiz'15	Prtvtdpl = 2	x			
	PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc; Law and Justice)	Prtvtpl = 5; Prtvtapl = 14; Prtvtbpl = 6; Prtvtcpl = 6; Prtvtdpl = 6; Prtvtepl = 5;	x		x	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		Prtvtfpl = 2				
	LPR (Liga Polskich Rodzin; League of Polish Families)	Prtvtpl = 10; Prtvtapl = 3; Prtvtbpl = 2;	X (until '10)		X (until '10)	
	SO (Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej; Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland)	Prtvtpl = 4; Prtvtapl = 16; Prtvtbpl = 7;	x			
	Other (Including ARS, PWN, NOP, IRP, Gonosc I Praca, PPN, RP, Non-Party Coalition) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtpl = 8,9; Prtvtapl = 4,7,10,11,15,19; Prtvtbpl = 8; Prtvtcpl = 7,9; Prtvtdpl = 9; Prtvtepl = 1,7; Prtvtfpl = 6				x
Slovakia	OLaNO (Obyčajní Ľudia A Nezávislé Osobnosti; Ordinary People and Independent Personalities)	Prtvtcsk = 1; Prtvtdsk = 1; Prtvtesk = 1;	x			
	SR (Sme Rodina; We are family)	Prtvtdsk = 8; Prtvtesk = 3	x		x	
	Smer (Smer – Slovenská Sociálna Demokracia; Direction – Slovak Social Democracy)	Prtvtsk = 3; Prtvtask = 3; Prtvtbsk = 3; Prtvtcsk = 3; Prtvtdsk = 3; Prtvtesk = 2	x			
	ANO (Aliancia Nového Obcana; Alliance of the New Citizen)	Prtvtsk = 6	x			
	HZDS / ĽS-HZDS (Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko; Movement for a Democratic Slovakia)	Prtvtsk = 1; Prtvtask = 1; Prtvtdsk = 5; Prtvtesk = 4	x			
	KSS (Komunistická Strana Slovenska; Communist Party of Slovakia)	Prtvtsk = 7		x		
	SNS (Slovenská Národná Strana; Slovak National Party)	Prtvtask = 6; Prtvtbsk = 1; Prtvtdsk = 2;	x		x	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
	Other	Prtvtsk = 8; Prtvtask = 7; Prtvtbsk = 7; Prtvtcsk = 7; Prtvtdsk = 9; Prtvtesk = 8				X
Slovenia	Levica (Levica; Left)	Prtvtfsi = 2; Prtvtgsi = 4	x	x		
	N.Si (Nova Slovenija – Krščanski Demokrati; New Slovenia – Christian Democrats)	Prtvtsi = 6; Prtvtasi = 4; Prtvtbsi = 6; Prtvtcsi = 4; Prtvtdsi = 3; Prtvtesi = 3; Prtvtfsi = 4; Prtvtgsi = 6	x		x	
	SDS (Slovenska Demokratska Stranka; Slovenian Democratic Party)	Prtvtsi = 5; Prtvtasi = 1; Prtvtbsi = 5; Prtvtcsi = 5; Prtvtdsi = 4; Prtvtesi = 6; Prtvtfsi = 8; Prtvtgsi = 8	x		X since 2015	
	LMS (Lista Marjana Šarca; List of Marjan Sarec)	Prtvtfsi = 3; Prtvtgsi = 5	x			
	PoS (Povežimo Slovenijo; Let's Connect Slovenia)	Prtvtgsi = 7	X*			
	Resni.ca (Resni.ca; Truth)	Prtvtgsi = 2	x			
	SNS (Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka; Slovenian National Party)	Prtvtsi = 4; Prtvtasi = 6; Prtvtbsi = 4; Prtvtcsi = 7; Prtvtdsi = 10; Prtvtfsi = 11; Prtvtgsi = 9	x		x	
	ZL (Združena levica; United Left)	Prtvtesi = 11	x	x		

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
	Other (Including SMS, LIPA, Zares, TRS, VERJAMEM) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtsi = 8,9; Prtvtasi = 8; Prtvtbsi = 8; Prtvtcsi = 3,9,10; Prtvtdsi = 9,11,12; Prtvtfsi = 12; Prtvtgsi = 12				X
Spain	BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego; Galician Nationalist Bloc)	Prtvtes = 9; Prtvtaes = 9; Prtvtbes = 7; Prtvtces = 9; Prtvtees = 12; Prtvtfes = 16; Prtvtges = 9;		x		
	CUP (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular; Popular Unity Candidacy)	Prtvtdes = 19; Prtvtees = 19; Prtvtfes = 10;		x		
	EHB (Euskal Herria Bildu; Basque Country Unite)	Prtvtdes = 14; Prtvtees = 14; Prtvtfes = 12; Prtvtges = 7;		x		
	Podemos (Podemos; We Can)	Prtvtdes = 4; Prtvtees = 4;	x	x		
	UP (Unidas Podemos; United We Can)	Prtvtdes = 3; Prtvtees = 3; Prtvtfes = 4;	x	x		
	Vox (Vox; Voice)	Prtvtees = 16; Prtvtfes = 3; Prtvtges = 3;	x		x	
	IU (Izquierda Unida; United Left)	Prtvtes = 3; Prtvtaes = 3; Prtvtbes = 3; Prtvtces = 4; Prtvtdes = 6; Prtvtes = 6;		x		
	Other (Including ERC, EA, CHA, NA-BAI, UPyD, AMAIUR, FAC, En Marea,	Prtvtes = 5,8,12,68; Prtvtaes = 5,8,12,13,74,75,76;				X

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
	PACMA, Teruel, SUMAR) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtbes = 5,9,10,74,75,76; Prtvtces = 5,6,8,12,13,14,15,16; Prtvtdes = 10,12,18,50,51,52; Prtvtees = 10,18,53,54,55; Prtvtfes = 8,18,53,54,55; Prtvtges = 4,5,12,50,51,52;				
Sweden	SD (Sverigedemokraterna; Sweden Democrats)	Prtvtase = 10; Prtvtbse = 10; Prtvtcse = 9; Prtvtdse = 7	x		x	
	V (Vänsterpartiet; Left Party)	Prtvtse = 7; Prtvtase = 7; Prtvtbse = 7; Prtvtcse = 7; Prtvtdse = 8		X*		
	Other (Including Feminist, Juni, and Pirate Party) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtse = 8; Prtvtase = 8,9,11; Prtvtbse = 8,9,11; Prtvtcse = 8,10; Prtvtdse = 9				X
Switzerland	EDU (Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union; Federal Democratic Union)	Prtvtch = 12; Prtvtach = 12; Prtvtbch = 11; Prtvtcch = 11; Prtvtdch = 9; Prtvtech = 9; Prtvtfch = 9; Prtvtgch = 9; Prtvthch = 9;			x	
	LdT (Lega dei Ticinesi; Ticino League)	Prtvtch = 15; Prtvtach = 15; Prtvtbch = 13; Prtvtcch = 13; Prtvtdch = 10;	x		x	

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		Prtvtech = 10; Prtvtfch = 10; Prtvtgch = 10; Prtvthch = 10;				
	PdA (Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz; Swiss Party of Labour)	Prtvtch = 9; Prtvtach = 9; Prtvtbch = 7; Prtvtcch = 7; Prtvtdch = 11; Prtvtech = 11; Prtvtfch = 11; Prtvtgch = 11; Prtvthch = 11		x		
	SVP (Schweizerische Volkspartei; Swiss People's Party)	Prtvtch = 4; Prtvtach = 4; Prtvtbch = 4; Prtvtcch = 4; Prtvtdch = 1; Prtvtech = 1; Prtvtfch = 1; Prtvtgch = 1; Prtvthch = 1	x		x	
	SOL (Solidarité; Solidarity)	Prtvthch = 12		x		
	MCG (Mouvement Citoyens Genevois; Geneva Citizens' Movement)	Prtvtdch = 12; Prtvtech = 12; Prtvtgch = 12; Prtvthch = 15	x		x	
	SD (Schweizer Demokraten; Swiss Democrats)	Prtvtch = 11; Prtvtach = 11; Prtvtbch = 10; Prtvtcch = 10; Prtvtdch = 15	x		x	
	Other (Including Alliance of Independents, FP, Women's Group, AL, Pirate Party) or Blanco/Invalid	Prtvtch = 6,13,14,16; Prtvtach = 13,14,16; Prtvtbch = 14,15,16; Prtvtcch = 18,19,20; Prtvtdch = 14,16,17,19,20;				

Country	Party	ESS codes	Populist	Far Left	Far Right	Protest
		Prtvtech = 14,15,16,17,18,19,20; Prtvtfch = 16,18,19,55; Prtvtgch = 13,14,15,16; Prtvthch = 12,16,7,18,20				
United Kingdom	DUP (Democratic Unionist Party; Democratic Unionist Party)	Prtvtgb = 12; Prtvtagb = 12; Prtvtbgb = 10; Prtvtcgb = 10; Prtvtdgb = 11	X*			
	BRX / Reform (Brexit Party / Reform Brexit Party / Reform)	Prtvtdgb = 8	x		x	
	UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party; United Kingdom Independence Party)	Prtvtagb = 8; Prtvtbgb = 7; Prtvtcgb = 7; Prtvtdgb = 7	x		x	
	All none Tory or Labour Parties	Prtvtgb = 3<>50; Prtvtagb = 3<>50; Prtvtbgb = 3<>50; Prtvtcgb = 3<>50; Prtvtdgb = 3<>50;				

Note: * indicates a swing case. For these parties, experts consulted for the PopuList did not come to full agreement over the classification of the political party, leading it to be a swing case following their method. Moreover, for some countries, a column is filled light red. This indicates that there is no party for that specific classification in that country. For example, in Poland, there are no far-left political parties that dissatisfied left-leaning voters can vote for, and in Ireland, there are no far-right political parties that dissatisfied right-leaning voter can support. Nonetheless, in all countries, there are parties that can be labelled as Populist.

Appendix C. Regression results explaining differences in political support, political participation, and voting behaviour

Table 1. Multi-Level Models Testing the Link Between Country-Level Wealth Inequality and Individual-Level Socio-Economic Standing for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Section 3.1)

Predictors	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Protest Voting	Radical Voting
	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	4.17 ***	3.95 **	0.12 **	0.66	0.12 *	17.66 *	3.71	1.93
	(1.24)	(1.26)	(0.08)	(0.45)	(0.13)	(20.35)	(6.97)	(2.40)
Time	0.00 ***	0.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.02 ***	1.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.04 ***	1.04 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 ***	0.16 ***	1.09 ***	1.15 ***	1.13 ***	1.23 ***	0.90 ***	0.89 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education Standardised	0.14 ***	0.08 ***	1.19 ***	1.31 ***	1.24 ***	1.30 ***	0.97 ***	0.97 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 ***	0.25 ***	1.76 ***	1.53 ***	1.77 ***	1.67 ***	0.73 ***	0.67 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 ***	0.15 ***	1.35 ***	1.37 ***	1.42 ***	1.43 ***	0.87 ***	0.84 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.40 ***	0.25 ***	1.77 ***	1.84 ***	1.88 ***	1.88 ***	0.89 ***	0.81 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.04 ***	0.01	0.83 ***	1.03 ***	0.77 ***	0.96 ***	0.84 ***	0.83 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.16 *** (0.01)	-0.17 *** (0.01)	1.18 *** (0.02)	1.44 *** (0.02)	0.99 (0.01)	0.67 *** (0.01)	1.19 *** (0.02)	1.13 *** (0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.20 *** (0.01)	-0.21 *** (0.01)	1.02 (0.01)	1.61 *** (0.02)	0.85 *** (0.01)	0.35 *** (0.01)	1.25 *** (0.02)	1.15 *** (0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.06 *** (0.01)	-0.11 *** (0.01)	0.96 * (0.02)	1.85 *** (0.03)	0.81 *** (0.01)	0.16 *** (0.00)	1.09 *** (0.02)	0.94 ** (0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.06 *** (0.00)	0.20 *** (0.00)	0.92 *** (0.00)	0.83 *** (0.00)	0.94 *** (0.00)	1.08 *** (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.00)	1.01 * (0.01)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.78 *** (0.00)	0.95 *** (0.00)	0.94 *** (0.00)	0.84 *** (0.00)	1.01 * (0.01)	1.00 (0.00)	0.83 *** (0.00)	0.84 *** (0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.02)	1.01 (0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 *** (0.00)	0.00 * (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.00 * (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 *** (0.02)	0.06 ** (0.02)	1.03 * (0.01)	1.07 ** (0.02)	1.08 *** (0.02)	1.02 (0.02)	0.94 (0.03)	0.93 * (0.04)
Control of Corruption, within	0.08 *** (0.00)	0.08 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)	1.03 *** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	1.00 (0.01)	0.97 ** (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.98 (0.02)	0.97 (0.02)	0.98 (0.02)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	-0.01 *** (0.00)	-0.01 ** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)	1.03 *** (0.00)	1.03 *** (0.00)

Random Effects

σ^2	3.36	3.19	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.21 Country	0.21 Country	0.08 Country	0.19 Country	0.16 Country	0.24 Country	0.47 Country	0.69 Country

ICC	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.13	0.17
N	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country
Observations	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	241912	241912
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.283 / 0.325	0.315 / 0.358	0.088 / 0.111	0.183 / 0.226	0.174 / 0.212	0.141 / 0.199	0.080 / 0.196	0.097 / 0.254

*$p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$*

Note: Results from the models above are used for Figures 1 to 4. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2022, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 2. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Between-Country-Level Wealth Inequality and Individual-Level Income for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Section 3.2)

Predictors	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Protest Voting	Radical Voting
	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	4.17 ***	3.98 **	0.13 **	0.75	0.14 *	17.49 **	1.91	3.64
	(1.24)	(1.26)	(0.09)	(0.71)	(0.11)	(19.02)	(5.11)	(5.64)
Time	0.00 ***	0.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.02 ***	1.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.04 ***	1.04 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.15 **	-0.28 ***	0.81 **	0.55 ***	0.58 ***	0.86 *	1.37 ***	1.23 **
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Education Standardised	0.14 ***	0.08 ***	1.20 ***	1.31 ***	1.25 ***	1.31 ***	0.96 ***	0.97 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 ***	0.25 ***	1.75 ***	1.53 ***	1.76 ***	1.67 ***	0.68 ***	0.73 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 ***	0.15 ***	1.35 ***	1.37 ***	1.42 ***	1.43 ***	0.84 ***	0.87 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.40 ***	0.25 ***	1.77 ***	1.83 ***	1.87 ***	1.87 ***	0.82 ***	0.89 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.04 ***	0.01	0.83 ***	1.03 ***	0.77 ***	0.96 ***	0.83 ***	0.84 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.16 ***	-0.17 ***	1.18 ***	1.44 ***	0.98	0.67 ***	1.13 ***	1.19 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.20 ***	-0.21 ***	1.01	1.61 ***	0.85 ***	0.35 ***	1.15 ***	1.25 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.06 ***	-0.11 ***	0.96 *	1.85 ***	0.81 ***	0.16 ***	0.94 **	1.09 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.06 ***	0.20 ***	0.92 ***	0.83 ***	0.95 ***	1.08 ***	1.01 *	0.97 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.78 ***	0.95 ***	0.94 ***	0.84 ***	1.01 *	1.00	0.84 ***	0.83 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.03	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.00 *	1.00	0.99 ***	1.00 *	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.06 **	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.93 *	0.94
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.08 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.04 ***	1.03 ***	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	0.97 *	0.98 *	0.98	0.98	0.97
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	-0.01 ***	-0.01 **	0.98 ***	1.01 ***	1.02 ***	0.98 ***	1.03 ***	1.03 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Objective Income Standardised * Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	**-0.00**	**0.01 *****	**1.00 *****	**1.01 *****	**1.01 *****	**1.00 *****	**0.99 *****	**1.00 *****
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**
Random Effects								

σ^2	3.36	3.19	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.21 Country	0.21 Country	0.08 Country	0.19 Country	0.16 Country	0.24 Country	0.69 Country	0.48 Country
ICC	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.17	0.13
N	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country
Observations	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	241912	241912
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.283 / 0.325	0.315 / 0.358	0.088 / 0.111	0.184 / 0.228	0.175 / 0.213	0.141 / 0.199	0.097 / 0.254	0.080 / 0.196

*$p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$*

Note: Results from the models above are used for Figures 5 and 6. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2022, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 3. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Between-Country-Level Wealth Inequality and Individual-Level Education for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Section 3.2)

Predictors	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Protest Voting	Radical Voting
	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	4.10 ** (1.25)	3.93 ** (1.26)	0.11 * (0.10)	0.66 (0.83)	0.12 ** (0.10)	17.73 (60.42)	1.93 (2.97)	3.95 (15.77)
Time	0.00 *** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.16 *** (0.00)	1.09 *** (0.01)	1.15 *** (0.01)	1.13 *** (0.01)	1.23 *** (0.01)	0.89 *** (0.01)	0.90 *** (0.01)
Education Standardised	0.67 *** (0.05)	0.21 *** (0.05)	1.78 *** (0.11)	1.26 *** (0.07)	1.32 *** (0.10)	1.68 *** (0.12)	0.96 (0.07)	0.70 *** (0.05)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.75 *** (0.03)	1.53 *** (0.02)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.67 *** (0.03)	0.67 *** (0.01)	0.73 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 *** (0.01)	0.15 *** (0.01)	1.35 *** (0.02)	1.37 *** (0.01)	1.42 *** (0.02)	1.43 *** (0.02)	0.84 *** (0.01)	0.87 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.39 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.76 *** (0.03)	1.84 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.03)	1.87 *** (0.04)	0.81 *** (0.02)	0.89 *** (0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.04 *** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	1.03 *** (0.01)	0.77 *** (0.01)	0.96 *** (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	0.84 *** (0.01)
Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.16 *** (0.01)	-0.17 *** (0.01)	1.18 *** (0.02)	1.44 *** (0.02)	0.99 (0.01)	0.67 *** (0.01)	1.13 *** (0.02)	1.19 *** (0.02)

Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.20 ***	-0.21 ***	1.02	1.61 ***	0.85 ***	0.35 ***	1.15 ***	1.25 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.06 ***	-0.11 ***	0.96 *	1.85 ***	0.81 ***	0.16 ***	0.94 **	1.09 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.06 ***	0.20 ***	0.92 ***	0.83 ***	0.94 ***	1.08 ***	1.01 *	0.97 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.78 ***	0.95 ***	0.94 ***	0.84 ***	1.01 *	1.00	0.84 ***	0.83 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.03	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.00 *	1.00	0.99 ***	1.00 *	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.06 **	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.93 *	0.94
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.08 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.04 ***	1.03 ***	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	-0.01 ***	-0.01 **	0.98 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.98 ***	1.03 ***	1.03 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education Standardised * Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	**-0.01 ***	**-0.00 **	**0.99 ***	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00 ***	**1.00**	**1.00 ***
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**

Random Effects

σ^2	3.35	3.19	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29

T_{00}	0.21 $_{Country}$	0.21 $_{Country}$	0.08 $_{Country}$	0.19 $_{Country}$	0.16 $_{Country}$	0.24 $_{Country}$	0.69 $_{Country}$	0.47 $_{Country}$
ICC	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.17	0.13
N	27 $_{Country}$	27 $_{Country}$	27 $_{Country}$	27 $_{Country}$	27 $_{Country}$	27 $_{Country}$	27 $_{Country}$	27 $_{Country}$
Observations	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	241912	241912
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.283 / 0.325	0.315 / 0.358	0.088 / 0.111	0.183 / 0.226	0.174 / 0.211	0.141 / 0.199	0.097 / 0.254	0.080 / 0.196

*$p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$*

Note: Results from the models above are used for Figures 7 to 8. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2022, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 4. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Between-Country-Level Wealth Inequality and Individual-Level Occupation for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Section 3.2)

	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Protest Voting	Radical Voting
Predictors	*Estimates*	*Estimates*	*Odds Ratios*	*Odds Ratios*	*Odds Ratios*	*Odds Ratios*	*Odds Ratios*	*Odds Ratios*
(Intercept)	3.99 **	4.01 **	0.15 *	1.07	0.27	21.22	1.57	3.81
	(1.25)	(1.26)	(0.12)	(1.03)	(0.30)	(78.35)	(7.64)	(12.03)
Time	0.00 ***	0.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.02 ***	1.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.04 ***	1.04 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 ***	0.16 ***	1.09 ***	1.15 ***	1.13 ***	1.23 ***	0.89 ***	0.90 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education Standardised	0.13 ***	0.08 ***	1.20 ***	1.31 ***	1.24 ***	1.31 ***	0.97 ***	0.97 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.77 ***	-0.16	1.44	0.39 ***	0.50 **	1.01	0.79	0.64 *
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.13)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.32 **	0.19	1.15	0.99	0.75	1.01	0.99	0.74
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.76 ***	0.19	1.06	0.91	0.35 ***	2.06 **	2.30 ***	1.45
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.52)	(0.58)	(0.33)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.04 ***	0.01	0.83 ***	1.03 ***	0.77 ***	0.96 ***	0.83 ***	0.84 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.16 *** (0.01)	-0.17 *** (0.01)	1.18 *** (0.02)	1.44 *** (0.02)	0.99 (0.01)	0.67 *** (0.01)	1.13 *** (0.02)	1.19 *** (0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.20 *** (0.01)	-0.21 *** (0.01)	1.02 (0.01)	1.61 *** (0.02)	0.85 *** (0.01)	0.35 *** (0.01)	1.15 *** (0.02)	1.25 *** (0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.06 *** (0.01)	-0.11 *** (0.01)	0.96 * (0.02)	1.85 *** (0.03)	0.81 *** (0.01)	0.16 *** (0.00)	0.94 ** (0.02)	1.09 *** (0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.06 *** (0.00)	0.20 *** (0.00)	0.92 *** (0.00)	0.83 *** (0.00)	0.94 *** (0.00)	1.08 *** (0.01)	1.01 * (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.00)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.78 *** (0.00)	0.95 *** (0.00)	0.94 *** (0.00)	0.84 *** (0.00)	1.01 * (0.01)	1.00 (0.00)	0.84 *** (0.00)	0.83 *** (0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	1.01 (0.02)	1.00 (0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 *** (0.00)	0.00 * (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.00 * (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 *** (0.02)	0.06 ** (0.02)	1.03 * (0.01)	1.07 ** (0.02)	1.08 *** (0.02)	1.02 (0.02)	0.93 * (0.04)	0.94 (0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.08 *** (0.00)	0.08 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)	1.03 *** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	1.00 (0.01)	0.96 ** (0.01)	0.97 * (0.01)	0.98 (0.05)	0.98 (0.06)	0.97 (0.04)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	-0.01 *** (0.00)	-0.01 ** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)	1.03 *** (0.00)	1.03 *** (0.00)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator * Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	**-0.01 ** (0.00)**	**0.01 ** (0.00)**	**1.00 (0.00)**	**1.02 *** (0.00)**	**1.02 *** (0.00)**	**1.01 * (0.00)**	**1.00 (0.00)**	**1.00 (0.00)**

Occupation: Skilled Service Workers * Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 [*] (0.00)	1.01 [**] (0.00)	1.00 [*] (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional * Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	-0.00 [*] (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	1.01 [*] (0.00)	1.01 [***] (0.00)	1.02 [***] (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.99 [***] (0.00)	0.99 [*] (0.00)
Random Effects								
σ^2	3.36	3.19	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.21 Country	0.21 Country	0.08 Country	0.18 Country	0.16 Country	0.24 Country	0.69 Country	0.47 Country
ICC	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.17	0.13
N	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country
Observations	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	241912	241912
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.283 / 0.325	0.315 / 0.358	0.088 / 0.111	0.183 / 0.227	0.175 / 0.213	0.141 / 0.199	0.097 / 0.254	0.080 / 0.196

*$p<0.05$ **$p<0.01$ ***$p<0.001$*

Note: Results from the models above are used for Figures 9 to 10. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2022, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 5. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Within-Country-Level Wealth Inequality and Individual-Level Income for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

Predictors	Political Trust Estimates	Satisfaction with Democracy Estimates	Institutional Participation Odds Ratios	Non-Institutional Participation Odds Ratios	Civic Participation Odds Ratios	Voted Odds Ratios	Protest Voting Odds Ratios	Radical Voting Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	4.17 *** (1.25)	3.94 ** (1.26)	0.12 *** (0.07)	0.66 (0.56)	0.12 (0.15)	17.75 *** (15.13)	1.92 (2.17)	3.71 (5.50)
Time	0.00 *** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.16 *** (0.00)	1.09 *** (0.01)	1.15 *** (0.01)	1.13 *** (0.01)	1.23 *** (0.01)	0.89 *** (0.01)	0.90 *** (0.01)
Education Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.08 *** (0.00)	1.19 *** (0.01)	1.31 *** (0.01)	1.24 *** (0.01)	1.30 *** (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.76 *** (0.03)	1.53 *** (0.02)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.67 *** (0.03)	0.67 *** (0.01)	0.73 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 *** (0.01)	0.15 *** (0.01)	1.35 *** (0.02)	1.37 *** (0.01)	1.42 *** (0.02)	1.43 *** (0.02)	0.84 *** (0.01)	0.87 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.40 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.84 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.04)	0.81 *** (0.02)	0.89 *** (0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.04 *** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	1.03 *** (0.01)	0.77 *** (0.01)	0.96 *** (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	0.84 *** (0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.16 ***	-0.17 ***	1.18 ***	1.44 ***	0.99	0.67 ***	1.13 ***	1.19 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.21 ***	-0.21 ***	1.01	1.61 ***	0.85 ***	0.35 ***	1.15 ***	1.25 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.06 ***	-0.11 ***	0.96 *	1.85 ***	0.81 ***	0.16 ***	0.94 **	1.09 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.06 ***	0.20 ***	0.92 ***	0.83 ***	0.94 ***	1.08 ***	1.01 *	0.97 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.78 ***	0.95 ***	0.94 ***	0.84 ***	1.01 *	1.00	0.84 ***	0.83 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.03	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.00 *	1.00	0.99 ***	1.00 *	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.06 **	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.93 *	0.94
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.08 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.04 ***	1.03 ***	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	0.97 **	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	-0.01 ***	-0.01 **	0.98 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.98 ***	1.03 ***	1.03 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Objective Income Standardised * Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	**-0.00**	**0.00**	**1.00**	**0.99 ****	**1.00**	**0.99 ***	**1.00**	**1.00**
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**

Random Effects

σ^2	3.36	3.19	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.21 Country	0.21 Country	0.08 Country	0.19 Country	0.16 Country	0.24 Country	0.69 Country	0.47 Country
ICC	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.17	0.13
N	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country
Observations	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	241912	241912
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.283 / 0.325	0.315 / 0.358	0.088 / 0.111	0.183 / 0.226	0.174 / 0.212	0.141 / 0.199	0.097 / 0.254	0.080 / 0.196

*$p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$*

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for income holds only for between-country differences or also applies for within-country changes to the wealth inequality level. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2022, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 6. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Within-Country-Level Wealth Inequality and Individual-Level Education for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

Predictors	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Protest Voting	Radical Voting
	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	4.18 *** (1.24)	3.95 ** (1.26)	0.12 ** (0.09)	0.67 (0.83)	0.12 * (0.12)	17.63 (40.41)	1.94 (2.20)	3.75 (60.10)
Time	0.00 *** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.16 *** (0.00)	1.09 *** (0.01)	1.15 *** (0.01)	1.13 *** (0.01)	1.23 *** (0.01)	0.89 *** (0.01)	0.90 *** (0.01)
Education Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.08 *** (0.00)	1.20 *** (0.01)	1.31 *** (0.01)	1.24 *** (0.01)	1.30 *** (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.76 *** (0.03)	1.53 *** (0.02)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.67 *** (0.03)	0.67 *** (0.01)	0.73 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 *** (0.01)	0.15 *** (0.01)	1.35 *** (0.02)	1.37 *** (0.01)	1.42 *** (0.02)	1.43 *** (0.02)	0.84 *** (0.01)	0.87 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.39 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.84 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.04)	0.81 *** (0.02)	0.89 *** (0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.04 *** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	1.03 *** (0.01)	0.77 *** (0.01)	0.96 *** (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	0.84 *** (0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.16 ***	-0.18 ***	1.18 ***	1.44 ***	0.98	0.67 ***	1.13 ***	1.19 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.21 ***	-0.21 ***	1.01	1.61 ***	0.85 ***	0.35 ***	1.15 ***	1.25 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.06 ***	-0.11 ***	0.96 *	1.85 ***	0.81 ***	0.16 ***	0.94 **	1.09 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.06 ***	0.20 ***	0.92 ***	0.83 ***	0.94 ***	1.08 ***	1.01 *	0.97 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.78 ***	0.95 ***	0.94 ***	0.84 ***	1.01 *	1.00	0.84 ***	0.83 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.03	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.00 *	1.00	0.99 ***	1.00 *	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.07 **	1.03 *	1.07 ***	1.08 ***	1.02	0.93 *	0.94
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.08 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.04 ***	1.03 ***	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.20)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	-0.01 ***	-0.01 ***	0.98 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 **	0.98 ***	1.03 ***	1.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education Standardised * Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	**0.02 ***	**0.01 ***	**1.01 **	**1.01 ***	**1.02 ***	**1.00**	**1.01 **	**1.01 ***
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**

Random Effects

σ^2	3.36	3.19	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.21 Country	0.21 Country	0.08 Country	0.18 Country	0.16 Country	0.24 Country	0.69 Country	0.48 Country
ICC	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.17	0.13
N	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country
Observations	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	241912	241912
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.283 / 0.325	0.315 / 0.358	0.088 / 0.111	0.183 / 0.226	0.174 / 0.212	0.141 / 0.199	0.097 / 0.254	0.080 / 0.196

*$p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$*

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for education holds only for between-country differences or also applies for within-country changes to the wealth inequality level. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2022, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 7. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Within-Country-Level Wealth Inequality and Individual-Level Occupation for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

Predictors	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Protest Voting	Radical Voting
	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	4.17 *** (1.25)	3.95 ** (1.26)	0.12 *** (0.07)	0.66 (0.89)	0.12 * (0.12)	17.76 ** (19.68)	1.92 (2.18)	3.71 (4.62)
Time	0.00 *** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.16 *** (0.00)	1.09 *** (0.01)	1.15 *** (0.01)	1.13 *** (0.01)	1.23 *** (0.01)	0.89 *** (0.01)	0.90 *** (0.01)
Education Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.08 *** (0.00)	1.19 *** (0.01)	1.31 *** (0.01)	1.24 *** (0.01)	1.31 *** (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.76 *** (0.03)	1.53 *** (0.02)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.67 *** (0.03)	0.67 *** (0.01)	0.73 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 *** (0.01)	0.15 *** (0.01)	1.35 *** (0.02)	1.37 *** (0.01)	1.42 *** (0.02)	1.43 *** (0.02)	0.84 *** (0.01)	0.87 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.40 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.84 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.04)	0.81 *** (0.02)	0.89 *** (0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.04 *** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	1.03 *** (0.01)	0.77 *** (0.01)	0.96 *** (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	0.84 *** (0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.16 ***	-0.17 ***	1.18 ***	1.44 ***	0.99	0.67 ***	1.13 ***	1.19 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.20 ***	-0.21 ***	1.02	1.61 ***	0.85 ***	0.35 ***	1.15 ***	1.25 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.06 ***	-0.11 ***	0.96 *	1.85 ***	0.81 ***	0.16 ***	0.94 **	1.09 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.06 ***	0.20 ***	0.92 ***	0.83 ***	0.94 ***	1.08 ***	1.01 *	0.97 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.78 ***	0.95 ***	0.94 ***	0.84 ***	1.01 *	1.00	0.84 ***	0.83 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.03	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.00 *	1.00	0.99 ***	1.00 *	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.06 **	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.93 *	0.94
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.08 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.04 ***	1.03 ***	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	-0.02 ***	-0.01 **	0.98 ***	1.03 ***	1.01	0.99	1.02 ***	1.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator * Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	**0.00**	**0.01**	**1.00**	**0.98 *****	**1.00**	**0.96 *****	**1.02**	**1.00**
	(0.01)	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**

Occupation: Skilled Service Workers * Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.01)	0.98 *** (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	0.98 *** (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional * Wealth Gini Coefficient, within	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.01)	1.02 (0.01)	0.97 *** (0.01)	1.03 *** (0.01)	1.02 ** (0.01)
Random Effects								
σ^2	3.36	3.19	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.21 Country	0.21 Country	0.08 Country	0.19 Country	0.16 Country	0.24 Country	0.69 Country	0.48 Country
ICC	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.17	0.13
N	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country	27 Country
Observations	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	289898	241912	241912
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.283 / 0.325	0.315 / 0.358	0.088 / 0.111	0.183 / 0.227	0.174 / 0.212	0.141 / 0.199	0.097 / 0.254	0.080 / 0.196

*p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001*

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for occupation holds only for between-country differences or also applies for within-country changes to the wealth inequality level. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2022, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 8. Multi-Level Models Testing the Link Between Country-Level Disposable Income Inequality and Individual-Level Socio-Economic Standing for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

Predictors	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Radical Voting	Protest Voting
	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	3.27 ***	3.61 ***	0.12 **	0.08 **	0.03 ***	11.24 *	3.24	2.85
	(0.91)	(0.87)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(12.83)	(3.46)	(4.32)
Time	-0.00 ***	0.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.04 ***	1.05 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 ***	0.15 ***	1.09 ***	1.15 ***	1.14 ***	1.23 ***	0.90 ***	0.89 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education Standardised	0.14 ***	0.08 ***	1.19 ***	1.29 ***	1.24 ***	1.30 ***	0.98 *	0.98 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 ***	0.25 ***	1.77 ***	1.55 ***	1.78 ***	1.68 ***	0.73 ***	0.67 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 ***	0.15 ***	1.34 ***	1.37 ***	1.43 ***	1.42 ***	0.87 ***	0.84 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.39 ***	0.25 ***	1.78 ***	1.86 ***	1.88 ***	1.87 ***	0.89 ***	0.81 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.03 ***	-0.00	0.83 ***	1.04 ***	0.75 ***	0.97 **	0.85 ***	0.83 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.14 ***	-0.16 ***	1.18 ***	1.45 ***	0.99	0.68 ***	1.17 ***	1.11 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.19 ***	-0.19 ***	1.02	1.64 ***	0.85 ***	0.36 ***	1.24 ***	1.13 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.05 ***	-0.10 ***	0.97	1.89 ***	0.81 ***	0.17 ***	1.10 ***	0.94 **
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.07 ***	0.20 ***	0.93 ***	0.84 ***	0.95 ***	1.09 ***	0.96 ***	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.79 ***	0.94 ***	0.95 ***	0.85 ***	1.01 **	1.01	0.84 ***	0.85 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.02	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 **	0.98 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.07 ***	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.94 *	0.92 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Control of Corruption, within	0.09 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.03 ***	1.02 ***	0.99 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.96	0.95
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	0.01 ***	0.02 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.98 ***	0.97 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Random Effects								
σ^2	3.35	3.16	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.20 Country	0.18 Country	0.09 Country	0.22 Country	0.21 Country	0.22 Country	0.46 Country	0.67 Country

ICC	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.17
N	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country
Observations	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	216850	216850
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.285 / 0.325	0.322 / 0.359	0.087 / 0.113	0.177 / 0.228	0.171 / 0.220	0.139 / 0.193	0.078 / 0.191	0.100 / 0.253

*$p<0.05$ **$p<0.01$ ***$p<0.001$

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for income holds only for wealth inequality or also applies for disposable income inequality. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2020, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The data availability of disposable income inequalities in the World Inequality Dataset (2024) is more limited. Specifically, there is no data obtained by the WID for disposable income inequalities in France, nor for any countries in the year 2022. This means that the sample used for these analyses contains one less country, and one less wave. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 9. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Between-Country-Level Disposable Income Inequality and Individual-Level Income for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

Predictors	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Radical Voting	Protest Voting
	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	3.25 *** (0.91)	3.61 *** (0.87)	0.13 *** (0.08)	0.08 ** (0.07)	0.04 ** (0.04)	11.23 ** (9.86)	2.87 (3.56)	3.29 (4.25)
Time	-0.00 *** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.05 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.34 *** (0.03)	0.13 *** (0.03)	0.82 *** (0.03)	0.80 *** (0.03)	0.77 *** (0.03)	1.21 *** (0.04)	0.80 *** (0.03)	0.73 *** (0.03)
Education Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.08 *** (0.00)	1.19 *** (0.01)	1.29 *** (0.01)	1.24 *** (0.01)	1.30 *** (0.01)	0.98 * (0.01)	0.98 * (0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.76 *** (0.03)	1.55 *** (0.02)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.68 *** (0.03)	0.67 *** (0.01)	0.73 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 *** (0.01)	0.15 *** (0.01)	1.34 *** (0.02)	1.37 *** (0.02)	1.43 *** (0.02)	1.42 *** (0.02)	0.84 *** (0.01)	0.87 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.39 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.78 *** (0.03)	1.86 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.04)	1.87 *** (0.04)	0.81 *** (0.02)	0.89 *** (0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.03 *** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	1.04 *** (0.01)	0.75 *** (0.01)	0.97 ** (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	0.85 *** (0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.15 ***	-0.16 ***	1.19 ***	1.46 ***	0.99	0.68 ***	1.11 ***	1.17 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.19 ***	-0.19 ***	1.02	1.64 ***	0.85 ***	0.36 ***	1.13 ***	1.24 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.05 ***	-0.10 ***	0.97	1.89 ***	0.81 ***	0.17 ***	0.94 **	1.09 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.06 ***	0.20 ***	0.93 ***	0.84 ***	0.95 ***	1.09 ***	1.00	0.96 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.79 ***	0.94 ***	0.95 ***	0.85 ***	1.01 **	1.01	0.85 ***	0.84 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.02	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 *	0.98 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.07 ***	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.92 *	0.94 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.09 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.03 ***	1.02 ***	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	-0.02	-0.01	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.95	0.96
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	0.01 ***	0.02 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.97 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Objective Income Standardised * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	**-0.01 ***	**0.00**	**1.01 ***	**1.01 ***	**1.01 ***	**1.00**	**1.00 **	**1.01 ***
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**

Random Effects

σ^2	3.35	3.16	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.20 Country	0.18 Country	0.09 Country	0.22 Country	0.21 Country	0.22 Country	0.67 Country	0.46 Country
ICC	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.17	0.12
N	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country
Observations	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	216850	216850
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.285 / 0.325	0.322 / 0.359	0.088 / 0.114	0.179 / 0.230	0.174 / 0.223	0.139 / 0.193	0.100 / 0.253	0.079 / 0.191

*$p<0.05$ **$p<0.01$ ***$p<0.001$*

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for income holds only for wealth inequality or also applies for disposable income inequality. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2020, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The data availability of disposable income inequalities in the World Inequality Dataset (2024) is more limited. Specifically, there is no data obtained by the WID for disposable income inequalities in France, nor for any countries in the year 2022. This means that the sample used for these analyses contains one less country, and one less wave. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Figure 1. Disparities in Political Support (Left) and Expressing Political Demands (Right) Along Income Cleavages in Countries with Enduringly Low and High Income Inequality

Table 10. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Between-Country-Level Disposable Income Inequality and Individual-Level Education for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Radical Voting	Protest Voting
Predictors	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	3.23 *** (0.91)	3.61 *** (0.87)	0.13 *** (0.08)	0.08 (0.18)	0.04 *** (0.03)	11.36 * (13.88)	2.89 (3.33)	3.34 (4.44)
Time	-0.00 *** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.05 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.15 *** (0.00)	1.09 *** (0.01)	1.15 *** (0.01)	1.13 *** (0.01)	1.23 *** (0.01)	0.89 *** (0.01)	0.90 *** (0.01)
Education Standardised	0.50 *** (0.03)	0.11 *** (0.03)	0.85 *** (0.03)	0.83 *** (0.03)	0.64 *** (0.03)	1.79 *** (0.07)	0.92 * (0.04)	0.82 *** (0.03)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.76 *** (0.03)	1.54 *** (0.02)	1.76 *** (0.03)	1.69 *** (0.03)	0.67 *** (0.01)	0.73 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 *** (0.01)	0.15 *** (0.01)	1.34 *** (0.02)	1.37 *** (0.02)	1.42 *** (0.02)	1.43 *** (0.02)	0.84 *** (0.01)	0.87 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.39 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.78 *** (0.03)	1.86 *** (0.03)	1.87 *** (0.04)	1.87 *** (0.04)	0.81 *** (0.02)	0.89 *** (0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.03 *** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	1.04 *** (0.01)	0.75 *** (0.01)	0.97 ** (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	0.85 *** (0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.14 ***	-0.16 ***	1.18 ***	1.45 ***	0.98	0.68 ***	1.11 ***	1.17 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.19 ***	-0.19 ***	1.02	1.64 ***	0.85 ***	0.36 ***	1.13 ***	1.24 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.04 ***	-0.10 ***	0.97	1.88 ***	0.81 ***	0.17 ***	0.94 **	1.10 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.07 ***	0.20 ***	0.93 ***	0.84 ***	0.95 ***	1.09 ***	1.00	0.96 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.79 ***	0.94 ***	0.95 ***	0.85 ***	1.02 **	1.01	0.86 ***	0.84 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.02	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 **	0.98 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.07 ***	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.92 *	0.94 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.09 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.03 ***	1.02 ***	0.98 ***	0.99 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	-0.02	-0.01	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.95	0.96
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	0.01 ***	0.02 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.97 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education Standardised * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	**-0.01 ***	**-0.00**	**1.01 ***	**1.01 ***	**1.02 ***	**0.99 ***	**1.00**	**1.00 ***
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**

Random Effects

σ^2	3.35	3.16	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.20 Country	0.18 Country	0.09 Country	0.22 Country	0.21 Country	0.22 Country	0.67 Country	0.46 Country
ICC	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.17	0.12
N	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country
Observations	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	216850	216850
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.285 / 0.326	0.322 / 0.359	0.089 / 0.115	0.180 / 0.231	0.179 / 0.228	0.140 / 0.195	0.100 / 0.252	0.078 / 0.191

*$p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$*

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for income holds only for wealth inequality or also applies for disposable income inequality. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2020, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The data availability of disposable income inequalities in the World Inequality Dataset (2024) is more limited. Specifically, there is no data obtained by the WID for disposable income inequalities in France, nor for any countries in the year 2022. This means that the sample used for these analyses contains one less country, and one less wave. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Figure 2. Disparities in Political Support (Left) and Expressing Political Demands (Right) Along Educational Cleavages in Countries with Enduringly Low and High Income Inequality

Table 11. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Between-Country-Level Disposable Income Inequality and Individual-Level Occupation for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Radical Voting	Protest Voting
Predictors	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	2.99 **	3.54 ***	0.17 **	0.11 **	0.07 *	10.43 *	4.79	6.10
	(0.91)	(0.87)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(10.41)	(17.54)	(8.28)
Time	-0.00 ***	0.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.05 ***	1.04 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 ***	0.15 ***	1.09 ***	1.15 ***	1.14 ***	1.23 ***	0.89 ***	0.90 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education Standardised	0.14 ***	0.08 ***	1.19 ***	1.29 ***	1.24 ***	1.30 ***	0.98 *	0.98 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	1.03 ***	0.30 ***	0.82 *	0.62 ***	0.55 ***	2.01 ***	0.20 ***	0.19 ***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.24)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.46 ***	0.28 ***	0.93	0.90	0.71 **	1.54 ***	0.40 ***	0.36 ***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.94 ***	0.38 ***	1.13	1.28 *	0.50 ***	2.54 ***	0.45 ***	0.40 ***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.34)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.03 ***	-0.00	0.83 ***	1.04 ***	0.76 ***	0.97 **	0.83 ***	0.85 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.15 ***	-0.16 ***	1.19 ***	1.45 ***	0.99	0.68 ***	1.11 ***	1.17 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.19 ***	-0.19 ***	1.02	1.64 ***	0.85 ***	0.36 ***	1.13 ***	1.24 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.05 ***	-0.10 ***	0.97	1.89 ***	0.81 ***	0.17 ***	0.93 **	1.09 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.06 ***	0.20 ***	0.93 ***	0.84 ***	0.95 ***	1.09 ***	1.00	0.96 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.79 ***	0.94 ***	0.95 ***	0.85 ***	1.02 **	1.01	0.86 ***	0.84 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.02	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 **	0.98 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.07 ***	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.92 *	0.94 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.09 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.03 ***	1.02 ***	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	-0.02	-0.01	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.94	0.94 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	0.01 ***	0.02 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.97 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	**-0.02 *****	**-0.00**	**1.02 *****	**1.02 *****	**1.03 *****	**1.00**	**1.03 *****	**1.04 *****
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	**-0.01 *****	**-0.00 ***	**1.01 *****	**1.01 *****	**1.02 *****	**1.00**	**1.02 *****	**1.02 *****
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**

Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	-0.01 *** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)	0.99 * (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)
Random Effects								
σ^2	3.35	3.16	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.20 Country	0.18 Country	0.09 Country	0.22 Country	0.21 Country	0.22 Country	0.67 Country	0.46 Country
ICC	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.17	0.12
N	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country
Observations	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	216850	216850
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.285 / 0.325	0.322 / 0.359	0.089 / 0.114	0.178 / 0.229	0.177 / 0.226	0.139 / 0.194	0.101 / 0.253	0.080 / 0.192

*$p<0.05$ **$p<0.01$ ***$p<0.001$*

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for income holds only for wealth inequality or also applies for disposable income inequality. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2020, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The data availability of disposable income inequalities in the World Inequality Dataset (2024) is more limited. Specifically, there is no data obtained by the WID for disposable income inequalities in France, nor for any countries in the year 2022. This means that the sample used for these analyses contains one less country, and one less wave. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Figure 3. Disparities in Political Support (Left) and Expressing Political Demands (Right) Along Occupational Cleavages in Countries with Enduringly Low and High Income Inequality

Table 12. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Within-Country-Level Disposable Income Inequality and Individual-Level Income for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

Predictors	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Radical Voting	Protest Voting
	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	3.27 ***	3.61 ***	0.12 ***	0.08 **	0.03 ***	11.23 *	2.85	3.24
	(0.91)	(0.88)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(12.59)	(4.80)	(4.88)
time	-0.00 ***	0.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.99 ***	1.05 ***	1.04 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 ***	0.15 ***	1.09 ***	1.15 ***	1.14 ***	1.23 ***	0.89 ***	0.90 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education Standardised	0.14 ***	0.08 ***	1.19 ***	1.29 ***	1.24 ***	1.30 ***	0.98 *	0.98 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 ***	0.25 ***	1.77 ***	1.55 ***	1.78 ***	1.68 ***	0.67 ***	0.73 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 ***	0.15 ***	1.34 ***	1.37 ***	1.43 ***	1.42 ***	0.84 ***	0.87 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.39 ***	0.25 ***	1.78 ***	1.86 ***	1.88 ***	1.87 ***	0.81 ***	0.89 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.03 ***	-0.00	0.83 ***	1.04 ***	0.75 ***	0.97 **	0.83 ***	0.85 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.14 *** (0.01)	-0.16 *** (0.01)	1.18 *** (0.02)	1.45 *** (0.02)	0.99 (0.01)	0.68 *** (0.01)	1.11 *** (0.02)	1.17 *** (0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.19 *** (0.01)	-0.19 *** (0.01)	1.02 (0.01)	1.64 *** (0.02)	0.85 *** (0.01)	0.36 *** (0.01)	1.13 *** (0.02)	1.24 *** (0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.05 *** (0.01)	-0.10 *** (0.01)	0.97 (0.02)	1.89 *** (0.03)	0.81 *** (0.02)	0.17 *** (0.00)	0.94 ** (0.02)	1.10 *** (0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.07 *** (0.00)	0.20 *** (0.00)	0.93 *** (0.00)	0.84 *** (0.00)	0.95 *** (0.01)	1.09 *** (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	0.96 *** (0.01)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.79 *** (0.00)	0.94 *** (0.00)	0.95 *** (0.00)	0.85 *** (0.00)	1.01 ** (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	0.85 *** (0.01)	0.84 *** (0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.02)	1.00 (0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 *** (0.00)	0.03 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	0.99 ** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 *** (0.02)	0.07 *** (0.02)	1.03 * (0.01)	1.07 ** (0.02)	1.08 *** (0.02)	1.02 (0.02)	0.92 * (0.04)	0.94 * (0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.09 *** (0.00)	0.08 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	1.03 *** (0.00)	1.02 *** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.02)	1.00 (0.02)	0.99 (0.02)	0.95 (0.03)	0.96 (0.03)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.02 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.97 *** (0.00)	0.98 *** (0.00)
Objective Income Standardised * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, Within	**0.00 ** (0.00)**	**0.01 *** (0.00)**	**1.00 (0.00)**	**1.00 (0.00)**	**1.00 (0.00)**	**1.00 (0.00)**	**1.00 (0.00)**	**1.00 (0.00)**

Random Effects

σ^2	3.35	3.16	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.20 Country	0.18 Country	0.09 Country	0.22 Country	0.21 Country	0.22 Country	0.67 Country	0.46 Country
ICC	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.17	0.12
N	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country
Observations	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	216850	216850
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.285 / 0.325	0.322 / 0.359	0.087 / 0.113	0.177 / 0.228	0.171 / 0.220	0.139 / 0.193	0.100 / 0.253	0.078 / 0.191

*$p<0.05$ **$p<0.01$ ***$p<0.001$*

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for income holds only for wealth inequality or also applies for disposable income inequality. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2020, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The data availability of disposable income inequalities in the World Inequality Dataset (2024) is more limited. Specifically, there is no data obtained by the WID for disposable income inequalities in France, nor for any countries in the year 2022. This means that the sample used for these analyses contains one less country, and one less wave. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 13. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Within-Country-Level Disposable Income Inequality and Individual-Level Education for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

Predictors	Political Trust	Satisfaction with Democracy	Institutional Participation	Non-Institutional Participation	Civic Participation	Voted	Radical Voting	Protest Voting
	Estimates	Estimates	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios	Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	3.27 *** (0.91)	3.61 *** (0.87)	0.12 ** (0.09)	0.08 *** (0.05)	0.03 *** (0.03)	11.26 ** (9.93)	2.86 (3.05)	3.25 (3.30)
Time	-0.00 *** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.05 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.15 *** (0.00)	1.09 *** (0.01)	1.15 *** (0.01)	1.14 *** (0.01)	1.23 *** (0.01)	0.89 *** (0.01)	0.90 *** (0.01)
Education Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.08 *** (0.00)	1.19 *** (0.01)	1.29 *** (0.01)	1.24 *** (0.01)	1.30 *** (0.01)	0.98 * (0.01)	0.98 * (0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.55 *** (0.02)	1.78 *** (0.03)	1.68 *** (0.03)	0.67 *** (0.01)	0.73 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 *** (0.01)	0.15 *** (0.01)	1.34 *** (0.02)	1.37 *** (0.02)	1.43 *** (0.02)	1.42 *** (0.02)	0.84 *** (0.01)	0.87 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.39 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.78 *** (0.03)	1.86 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.04)	1.87 *** (0.04)	0.81 *** (0.02)	0.89 *** (0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.03 *** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	1.04 *** (0.01)	0.76 *** (0.01)	0.97 ** (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	0.85 *** (0.01)

Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.14 ***	-0.16 ***	1.18 ***	1.45 ***	0.98	0.68 ***	1.11 ***	1.17 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.19 ***	-0.19 ***	1.02	1.64 ***	0.85 ***	0.36 ***	1.13 ***	1.24 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.05 ***	-0.10 ***	0.97	1.89 ***	0.81 ***	0.17 ***	0.94 **	1.10 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.07 ***	0.20 ***	0.93 ***	0.84 ***	0.95 ***	1.09 ***	1.00	0.96 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.79 ***	0.94 ***	0.95 ***	0.85 ***	1.01 **	1.01	0.85 ***	0.84 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.02	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 **	0.98 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.07 ***	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.92 *	0.94 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.09 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.03 ***	1.02 ***	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.95 *	0.96 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	0.01 ***	0.02 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.01 ***	0.97 ***	0.98 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education Standardised * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, Within	**-0.00**	**-0.00**	**0.99 *****	**1.00**	**0.99 *****	**1.00 ***	**0.99 *****	**0.99 *****
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**
Random Effects								

σ^2	3.35	3.16	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.20 Country	0.18 Country	0.09 Country	0.22 Country	0.21 Country	0.22 Country	0.68 Country	0.46 Country
ICC	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.17	0.12
N	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country
Observations	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	216850	216850
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.285 / 0.325	0.322 / 0.359	0.087 / 0.113	0.177 / 0.228	0.171 / 0.220	0.139 / 0.193	0.100 / 0.253	0.079 / 0.192

*p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001*

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for income holds only for wealth inequality or also applies for disposable income inequality. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2020, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The data availability of disposable income inequalities in the World Inequality Dataset (2024) is more limited. Specifically, there is no data obtained by the WID for disposable income inequalities in France, nor for any countries in the year 2022. This means that the sample used for these analyses contains one less country, and one less wave. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Table 14. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Within-Country-Level Disposable Income Inequality and Individual-Level Occupation for Political Support, Political Participation, and Voting Behaviour (Robustness)

Predictors	Political Trust Estimates	Satisfaction with Democracy Estimates	Institutional Participation Odds Ratios	Non-Institutional Participation Odds Ratios	Civic Participation Odds Ratios	Voted Odds Ratios	Radical Voting Odds Ratios	Protest Voting Odds Ratios
(Intercept)	3.27 *** (0.91)	3.61 *** (0.87)	0.12 *** (0.07)	0.08 *** (0.06)	0.03 ** (0.04)	11.23 ** (9.05)	2.85 (3.94)	3.24 (3.14)
Time	-0.00 *** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	1.01 *** (0.00)	0.99 *** (0.00)	1.05 *** (0.00)	1.04 *** (0.00)
Objective Income Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.15 *** (0.00)	1.09 *** (0.01)	1.15 *** (0.01)	1.14 *** (0.01)	1.23 *** (0.01)	0.89 *** (0.01)	0.90 *** (0.01)
Education Standardised	0.14 *** (0.00)	0.08 *** (0.00)	1.19 *** (0.01)	1.29 *** (0.01)	1.24 *** (0.01)	1.30 *** (0.01)	0.98 * (0.01)	0.98 * (0.01)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.30 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.77 *** (0.03)	1.55 *** (0.02)	1.78 *** (0.03)	1.68 *** (0.03)	0.67 *** (0.01)	0.73 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.17 *** (0.01)	0.15 *** (0.01)	1.34 *** (0.02)	1.37 *** (0.02)	1.43 *** (0.02)	1.42 *** (0.02)	0.84 *** (0.01)	0.87 *** (0.01)
Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional (ref. Blue Collar and Unskilled Service Workers)	0.39 *** (0.01)	0.25 *** (0.01)	1.78 *** (0.03)	1.86 *** (0.03)	1.88 *** (0.04)	1.87 *** (0.04)	0.81 *** (0.02)	0.89 *** (0.02)
Gender: Woman (ref. Man)	0.03 *** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	1.04 *** (0.01)	0.76 *** (0.01)	0.97 ** (0.01)	0.83 *** (0.01)	0.85 *** (0.01)
Age Group: 50-64 (ref. 65+)	-0.14 *** (0.01)	-0.16 *** (0.01)	1.18 *** (0.02)	1.45 *** (0.02)	0.99 (0.01)	0.68 *** (0.01)	1.11 *** (0.02)	1.17 *** (0.02)

Age Group: 30-49 (ref. 65+)	-0.19 ***	-0.19 ***	1.02	1.64 ***	0.85 ***	0.36 ***	1.13 ***	1.24 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age Group: 15-29 (ref. 65+)	-0.05 ***	-0.10 ***	0.97	1.89 ***	0.81 ***	0.17 ***	0.94 **	1.10 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left-Right Placement Standardised	0.07 ***	0.20 ***	0.93 ***	0.84 ***	0.95 ***	1.09 ***	1.00	0.96 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Satisfaction with Public Services Standardised	0.79 ***	0.94 ***	0.95 ***	0.85 ***	1.01 **	1.01	0.85 ***	0.84 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP per Capita, between	0.02	0.02	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita Growth, within	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 ***	0.99 **	0.98 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Control of Corruption, between	0.08 ***	0.07 ***	1.03 *	1.07 **	1.08 ***	1.02	0.92 *	0.94 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Control of Corruption, within	0.09 ***	0.08 ***	1.02 ***	1.02 ***	1.03 ***	1.02 ***	0.98 ***	0.99 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, between	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.95	0.96 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	0.01 ***	0.01 ***	1.01 ***	1.00	1.01 **	1.01 ***	0.98 ***	0.99 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Occupation: Capital Accumulator * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	**0.00**	**0.01 ****	**0.98 *****	**1.00**	**0.99 ***	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**
Occupation: Skilled Service Workers * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	**0.00**	**0.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**	**(0.00)**

Occupation: Socio-Cultural Professional * Disposable Income Gini Coefficient, within	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 [*] (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	0.98 [**] (0.01)	0.99 (0.01)
Random Effects								
σ^2	3.35	3.16	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
τ_{00}	0.20 Country	0.18 Country	0.09 Country	0.22 Country	0.21 Country	0.22 Country	0.67 Country	0.46 Country
ICC	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.17	0.12
N	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country	26 Country
Observations	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	258964	216850	216850
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.285 / 0.325	0.322 / 0.359	0.087 / 0.113	0.177 / 0.228	0.171 / 0.220	0.139 / 0.193	0.100 / 0.253	0.078 / 0.191

*$p<0.05$ **$p<0.01$ ***$p<0.001$*

Note: Robustness checks to examine whether estimated interaction results for income holds only for wealth inequality or also applies for disposable income inequality. Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), OECD (GDP per Capita), World Bank (Control of Corruption), and the European Social Survey (all individual-level data). The models cover the period from 2002 to 2020, with a random intercept specified for countries and a fixed-effect time trend included to account for temporal variation. Linear fixed-effects multi-level models were used for political support, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for voting behaviour and political participation. The data availability of disposable income inequalities in the World Inequality Dataset (2024) is more limited. Specifically, there is no data obtained by the WID for disposable income inequalities in France, nor for any countries in the year 2022. This means that the sample used for these analyses contains one less country, and one less wave. The unstandardised regression coefficients are reported.

Appendix D. Robustness test based on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

In line with the grant agreement, the research questions of this report were also investigated using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). We analysed data from Module 5 (2016-2021), which has the most recent coverage of questions on political support and participation. Variables were selected that were comparable to the ones based on the European Social Survey, but it should be noted that the CSES does not have items on participation beyond voting, nor does it contain questions on political trust. The analyses focus on EU-member states that participated in the CSES (which also covers various other geographic regions).

The dependent variables in the dataset are coded as follows: voting turnout captures whether respondents indicated if they intended (or not) to vote in the main election under study, coded as 1 for those who (intended to have) voted and 0 for those who did not (84% indicated they would vote). Satisfaction with democracy was asked using a Likert scale, ranging from 1 "not at all satisfied", to 5 "very satisfied". The degree of populist votes measures respondents' vote choice in the main election, linked to the CSES Populism Scale, which rates political parties on a continuum from 0 (least populist) to 10 (most populist). Respondents are categorised based on the populism score of the party they voted for.

The explanatory variables in the dataset are coded as follows: Age indicates the respondent's age in years, ranging from 16 to over 100. Gender is coded as 0 for male and 1 for females or others (woman +). The respondent's education level is based on ISCED standards, from early childhood education (level 0) to doctoral education or equivalent (level 8). Income captures household income into quintiles, with the first quintile representing the lowest incomes and the fifth the highest. Ideology captures the respondents' self-placement on a left-right ideological scale, ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right), with intermediate values representing varying degrees of centrism. The country-level variables wealth inequality, control of corruption and GDP per capita are based on the same operationalisations as those reported in the main text.

Altogether, the models confirm that higher educated and wealthier citizens tend to be more satisfied with their democracies and report higher turnout rates. They are also less likely to vote for populist parties. The quality of governance, as measured by control of corruption, is positively associated with satisfaction with democracy and negatively associated with voting for populist parties. In contrast to the main findings, GDP per capita and wealth inequality are not related to any of the indicators of political support or participation. The interaction effects largely suggest dampening effects, but their overall magnitude is negligible. It is important to note, however, that with only 23 second-level units (observations at the country-year level), the statistical power of these multilevel models is insufficient to yield fully reliable results for country-level indicators or cross-level interactions (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016).

Table 1. Multi-Level Models Testing Interaction Effects of Between-Country-Level Wealth Inequality and Individual-Level Education/Income for Political Support, and Voting Behaviour

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voted	Voted	Satisfaction with democracy	Satisfaction with democracy	Degree of populist vote	Degree of populist vote
	(1 = yes)	(1 = yes)				
Age	0.023***	0.023***	0.004***	0.004***	-0.009***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Woman+	-0.016	-0.016	0.027	0.026	-0.148***	-0.150***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Education	0.840***	0.199***	0.211***	0.026***	1.059***	-0.098***
	(0.156)	(0.013)	(0.046)	(0.004)	(0.118)	(0.010)
Income	0.211***	0.491*	0.088***	0.139*	-0.158***	1.105***
	(0.017)	(0.196)	(0.006)	(0.059)	(0.014)	(0.152)
Ideology	0.034***	0.035***	0.017***	0.017***	0.016*	0.015*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)
GDP per capita	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Control of corruption	0.180	0.195	0.364*	0.366*	-1.984**	-1.979**
	(0.368)	(0.363)	(0.176)	(0.179)	(0.682)	(0.685)
Wealth Gini	0.040	0.008	0.010	-0.001	0.006	-0.027
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Education*Gini	-0.009***		-0.002***		-0.016***	
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
Income* Gini		-0.004		-0.001		-0.017***
		(0.003)		(0.001)		(0.002)

Intercept	-5.747**	-3.352	0.580	1.434	5.513	7.880*
	(1.968)	(1.866)	(0.902)	(0.898)	(3.411)	(3.400)
Variance (constant)	0.387**	0.377**				
	(0.122)	(0.119)				
lns1_1_1_cons			-1.201***	-1.186***	0.156	0.161
			(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.149)
lnsig_e_cons			0.131***	0.131***	0.937***	0.937***
			(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
N country	23	23	23	23	23	23
N individual	26750	26750	26618	26618	21202	21202
AIC	15772.677	15787.674	82627.564	82643.038	100033.760	100061.318
BIC	15862.814	15877.812	82725.836	82741.310	100129.302	100156.861

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Note: Data for the respective variables was obtained from the World Inequality Dataset (Wealth Gini Coefficient), World Bank (GDP per Capita; Control of Corruption), and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Module 5 – covering elections between 2016-2021) (all individual-level data). The models have a random intercept specified for country-election combinations. Linear fixed-effect multi-level models were used for satisfaction with democracy and degree of populist vote, while logit fixed-effects multi-level models were applied for turnout. The unstandardised (ols/logit) regression coefficients are reported in the table.

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